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Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX 
and Sex Discrimination in Athletics 
Diane Heckman* 
The basic discovery about any people is the discovery of 
the relationship between its men and its women. 
—Pearl S. Buck1 
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1 PEARL S. BUCK, OF MEN AND WOMEN 20 (2d ed. 1971). 
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INTRODUCTION: THE “GLASS SNEAKER” STILL EXISTS 
This Article examines the prisms of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter “Title IX”),2  the federal gender 
discrimination statute applicable to educational programs and 
activities, as it celebrates its thirtieth anniversary.  It portrays Title 
IX’s application to athletics through traditional curriculum 
educational programs as well as extracurricular athletic activities, 
including promoting equal opportunity for the recipient students 
and student-athletes, as well as the attendant athletic personnel.  
Remarkably, three decades after Title IX’s passage, the “glass 
sneaker”3 continues to exist, limiting participation opportunities 
and benefits for female athletes4 and athletic department positions, 
 
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2000).  This statute may now be cited as the “Patsy 
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act.”  Pub. L. 107-255, 2002 H.J. Res. 
113 (approved Oct. 29, 2002).  President Richard M. Nixon signed Title IX into law on 
June 23, 1972.  President Nixon had purportedly made a concerted effort to have the first 
woman appointed to the bench of the Supreme Court.  Reportedly, the former president 
uttered to Attorney General John Mitchell, “I don’t think a woman should be in any 
government job whatever . . . mainly because they are erratic.  And emotional. . . .  I lean 
to a woman only because, frankly, I think at this time, John, we got to pick up every half 
a percentage point we can.” Jeffrey Rosen, Renchburg’s the One!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2001, § 7 at 15, col. 1 (reviewing JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD 
STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001)). 
3 The author coined this term to represent the glass ceiling for female students’ 
participation in athletic endeavors and the rather meager employment positions of 
females in athletics. See Diane Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty Year 
Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 63 (1992).   
4 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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including coaches.5  The term “glass sneaker” reflects that, while 
impressive strides have been made for female students since Title 
IX’s inception thirty years ago, females are still imbued with the 
attitude that athletic employment, participation opportunities, and 
benefits are a gift and not an entitlement. 
The Title IX statute heralds: “No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”6  In addition to the statute, there are implementing 
regulations,7 a policy interpretation,8 and myriad other official 
documents9 governing this area.  To prove a prima facie Title IX 
case, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) an educational program 
or activity is involved;10 (2) the defendant entity is a recipient of 
federal funds;11 and (3) discrimination occurred on the basis of sex 
in the provision or non-provision of the educational program or 
 
5 See infra Part III.B. 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
7 Department of Education [DOE] Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education 
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance [hereinafter Title IX 
Regulations], 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002) (originally promulgated by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare). 
8 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics [hereinafter Policy Interpretation], 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 
1979). 
9 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS [OCR], TITLE IX 
INVESTIGATOR’S ATHLETICS MANUAL (1990); OCR, Clarification of Intercollegiate 
Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test (1996), http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ 
docs/clarific.html. 
10 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). See also Sternberg v. U.S.A. Nat’l Karate-Do Fed’n, 123 F. 
Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (deciding whether an Olympic program constituted an 
educational program); Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold and Procedural 
Issues, 153 EDUC. L. REP. 849, 855–56 (2001) (addressing, in detail, recent case law 
concerning Title IX threshold procedural issues, including whether an “educational” 
program or activity was involved). 
11 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). See also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 
20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2000) (legislatively overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 
555 (1984) (utilizing a narrow definition of whether a program or activity had received 
federal funds)); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (holding 
that the National Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA] was not subject to Title IX 
jurisdiction due to its receipt of contributions from member colleges and universities, 
who had received federal funds); Heckman, supra note 10, at 854–55 (discussing Smith). 
5 - HECKMAN FORMAT 4/15/03  9:51 AM 
554 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 551 
activities.12  The statute did not enunciate whether an individual 
could assert a private Title IX cause of action,13 whether section 
1983 causes of action14 are preempted by Title IX,15 or which 
statute of limitations should be used.16  There have been no 
legislative changes to alleviate these concerns, resulting in 
extensive litigation.17  Many of the issues, especially the awarding 
 
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
13 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (allowing a private 
right of action in a sexual harassment case involving peer sexual harassment); Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (sanctioning a private right of action in 
a sexual harassment case involving a teacher and student); Heckman, supra note 10, at 
852–53. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  This statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or the proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. 
15 Compare Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that Title IX does subsume a § 1983 cause of action), and Waid v. Merrill Area 
Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX does subsume a Section 
1983 cause of action), with Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding that both can coexist), and Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding that both can coexist). See also Norris v. Norwalk Pub. Schs., 124 F. 
Supp. 2d 791 (D. Conn. 2000) (concluding that Title IX does subsume a § 1983 action); 
Heckman, supra note 10, at  860–61. 
16 See Doe v. Howe Military Sch., 227 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
female plaintiff did not commence her lawsuit within two years of her turning eighteen 
(the age of majority) in this jurisdiction); Heckman, supra note 10, at 862–64.  Other 
issues such as proper party plaintiffs and defendants have also arisen. See, e.g., Morgan v. 
City of New York, 166 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a mother does not have 
a Title IX cause of action for sex discrimination concerning benefits denied to her 
daughter in the Choir Academy of Harlem but granted to the nationally known Boys 
Choir of Harlem, Inc.); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 F. Supp. 
2d 729, 743 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“Individuals who exercise administrative control over an 
entity which is subject to Title IX liability may be sued in their official capacity. . . .  This 
is because official capacity suits represent another way of pleading an action against the 
entity represented by the individuals.”). But see Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that a school superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity in a 
student’s claim of sexual harassment based on her complaint of sexual abuse by a 
teacher); Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 127 F. Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that Title IX legislation is aimed at redressing sex discrimination against the educational 
institution, rather than the individual). See Heckman, supra note 10, at 862–64. 
17 See Heckman, supra note 10. 
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of monetary damages,18 and whether those damages should be 
compensatory19 or punitive,20 remain unsettled. 
Shadowing the federal statute is the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause,21 since classifications are being made 
based on the gender of individuals.  In United States v. Virginia,22 
the Supreme Court determined that the Virginia Military Institute 
(VMI), a public single-sex military school, which had a Title IX 
statutory exemption, violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause because VMI specifically 
 
18 See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that 
monetary damages were permissible when intentional discrimination was proven); 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86 (calling into question whether Title IX should allow for 
unlimited monetary damages since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) [hereinafter Title VII], another federal statute prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment, had a cap of $300,000); Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 
F.3d 568, 571 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that proof of prior notice to the university is 
required to recover monetary damages), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002); Horner v. 
Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000) (directing that proof of 
intentional discrimination is required to obtain monetary damages); Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 
138 F.3d 653, 678 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although Franklin holds that there is an implied 
private right of action for damages to enforce Title IX, . . . it does not command the 
inferior courts to award damages in problematic cases before school districts know what 
is expected of them.”) (citation omitted); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 144 F. 
Supp. 2d 526 (W.D. Va. 2001) (granting each of the named female student-plaintiffs 
$17,000 in damages for failure to properly align female teams in the appropriate season); 
Angela Vicari, Title IX Victory in Virginia, WOMEN’S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Sept./Oct. 
2000, at 15 (discussing the Alston jury award); infra text accompanying notes 106–119, 
127. 
19 See Heckman,  supra note 10, at 866–67. 
20 On November 15, 2002, the Fourth Circuit ruled, in Mercer v. Duke University, 50 
Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002), that punitive damages were not available against a 
private university in a case where the jury awarded a female student $2 million in 
punitive damages. See also infra text accompanying note 65.  For earlier cases discussing 
punitive damages, see, e.g., Landon v. Oswego Unit Sch. Dist. # 308, 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1011 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (disallowing punitive damages in a Title IX lawsuit against a local 
school board); Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.H. 1997) 
(allowing punitive damages); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997) (finding that punitive damages cannot be recovered against a school district). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973). 
22 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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excluded female students.  The case is notable since the Court 
embraced pivotal language utilizing the intermediate standard in 
addressing equal protection claims based on sex discrimination.23  
The next issue on the horizon is whether an individual may assert a 
Title IX cause of action against a state entity or state actor without 
abridging the Eleventh Amendment.24 
Title IX celebrated its silver anniversary on June 23, 1997.25  
During the first twenty-five years of Title IX, the Supreme Court 
confined itself to only four substantive decisions.  In this 
introductory period, the Court rendered decisions in Cannon v. 
University of Chicago,26 holding there is a private right of action to 
 
23 Id. at 531–33 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must 
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action. . . .  Focusing on the 
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing 
court must determine whether the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’  The 
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. . . .  The 
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation.  And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”). 
24 The Eleventh Amendment protects the sovereign immunity of states and would bar 
equitable as well as monetary relief from the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See also 
Morris v. Wallace Cmty. Coll.-Selma, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 2001) 
(“Whether an entity other than the state itself partakes of the state’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity depends on whether it is an ‘arm of the state.’”), aff’d, 34 Fed. Appx. 388 (11th  
Cir. 2002).  Factors to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state include: the 
definitions of “state” and “political subdivision,” the state’s degree of control over the 
entity, and the fiscal autonomy of the entity, which may include what entity would be 
responsible for paying judgments against the sued entity. Id. See also Civil Rights 
Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)(1994) (expressly abrogating 
Eleventh Amendment immunity for states in a Title IX action).  Congress has the 
authority, under its Spending Clause power, to eliminate state sovereign immunity in this 
fashion. See, e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Horner v. 
Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 2000); Litman v. George 
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 
1997); Heckman, note 10, at 856–60. 
25 See Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year 
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SETON HALL 
J. SPORT L. 391 (1997). 
26 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) 
(“In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court held that a private right of action existed 
to enforce Title IX . . . .”) (citation omitted); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 
186, 231 (1996) (“Our holding in Cannon, that Title IX . . . created a private right of 
action for victims of discrimination in education, relied heavily on the fact that during the 
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enforce this law; North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,27 
upholding the validity of certain Title IX regulations; Grove City 
College v. Bell,28 holding that even if an educational program does 
not directly receive federal funds, Title IX still applies; and 
Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools,29 articulating that 
monetary damages may be available in a Title IX lawsuit when 
intentional discrimination is established.  The subsequent influx of 
Title IX lawsuits can be traced to this last decision.  Since 1997, 
the Supreme Court has issued three new Title IX decisions, which 
examined student sexual harassment actions against educational 
institutions due to actions of teachers,30  reviewed sexual 
harassment actions against educational institutions involving peer 
sexual harassment,31 and explored Title IX’s scope, specifically 
whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is 
included.32  Parties have been appealing Title IX cases to the 
Supreme Court in record numbers.33 
 
1960s the Court had consistently found such remedies notwithstanding the absence of an 
express direction from Congress.”). 
27 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
28 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  
29 503 U.S. 60 (1992). See also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 196 (1996) (“In Franklin, 
we held only that the implied private right of action under Title IX . . .  supports a claim 
for monetary damages.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (“[W]e 
held in Franklin that the right of action under Title IX . . . included a claim for 
damages.’). 
30 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
31 Davis v. Monroe County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
32 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). See also Brentwood 
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (holding that a state 
high school athletic association is within Title IX’s scope). 
Nor do we think there is anything to be said for the Association’s contention 
that there is no need to treat it as a state actor since any public school applying 
the Association’s rules is itself subject to suit under § 1983 or Title IX.  If 
Brentwood’s claim were pushing at the edge of the class of possible defendant 
state actors, an argument about the social utility of expanding that class would 
at least be on point, but because we are nowhere near the margin in this case, 
the Association is really asking for nothing less than a dispensation for itself.   
Id. at 304–05 (citation omitted).  
33 See, e.g., Grandson v. Univ. of Minnesota, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001) (equal 
opportunity: female student-athletes), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002); Doe v. Dallas 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000) (sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1073 (2001); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 
1999) (equal opportunity: male and female student-athletes), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 
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This Article, while addressing seminal decisions of the past 
thirty years, concentrates on recent decisions, and is divided into 
three major topics.  Part I examines the governing regulations.  
Part II discusses equal opportunity on behalf of student-athletes.  
Part III explores sex discrimination in educational employment, 
and, specifically, the unresolved issue of whether Title IX affords a 
separate cause of action to safeguard against sex discrimination 
vis-à-vis utilizing other federal anti-discrimination statutes.34 
 
(2000); Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch., 163 F.3d 749 (sexual harassment: student-
student), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 
544 (4th Cir. 1999) (sexual harassment related), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); 
Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (employment: termination of 
female women’s head basketball coach), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999); Floyd  v. 
Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (sexual harassment), cert. denied,  528 U.S. 891 
(1999); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(sexual harassment: teacher-student and student-student), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 
(1999); Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1998); N. Lawrence 
Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Mary M., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1997) (sexual harassment: teacher-
student), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 
1997) (sexual harassment), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1114 (1998); Rowinsky v. Bryan 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment: student-student), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996); Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(education employees generally: termination of dental hygienist program at the 
university), cert. denied sub nom. Brine v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997); 
Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment: 
university policy), cert. denied sub nom. Beeman v. Cohen,  520 U.S. 1140 (1997); 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (equal opportunity on behalf of 
female student-athletes), cert. denied,  520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert. denied,  
520 U.S. 1265 (1997); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995) (education 
employees generally: termination), cert. denied sub nom. Lakoski v. Univ. of Tex., Med. 
Branch at Galveston, 519 U.S. 947 (1996); El-Attar v. Miss. State Univ., 68 F.3d 468 
(5th Cir. 1995) (education programs generally), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094 (1996); 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (sexual 
harassment: outside organization’s presentation to students), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 
(1996); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment: 
teacher-student), cert. denied sub nom. Lankford v. Doe,  513 U.S. 815 (1994); Kelley v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (equal opportunity: male 
student-athletes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Roberts v. Col. State Bd. of Agric., 
998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (equal opportunity: female student-athletes), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Williams v. Bethlehem Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(athletics: cross-over case), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994). 
34 See Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination 
in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997).  Neither the Title IX statute nor 
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I. TITLE IX GENERAL APPLICATION REGULATIONS, 
INCLUDING THE GOVERNANCE OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION CLASSES 
While courts have robustly addressed the constitutionality of 
the Title IX regulations in the past,35 there has been no new case 
law within the past decade.  There have been no changes to any of 
the regulations since their enactment in 1975.36  A handful of 
regulations set forth certain procedural items, such as the 
designation of a Title IX coordinator;37 the publishing of a Title IX 
notice;38 and the adoption and publishing of grievance procedures 
to handle Title IX complaints internally within the educational 
institution.39 
In the past thirty years, there have been no major decisions 
addressing traditional educational curriculum.40  There are 
 
implementing regulations refer explicitly to sexual harassment, although the courts have 
implied its application within Title IX’s coverage.  This Article will not address Title IX 
sexual harassment.  
35 Title IX Regulations, 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002). See also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. 
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (finding regulations involving educational employment were 
constitutional); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Ass’n, 443 
F. Supp. 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (finding the regulations violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment), rev’d, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D. Kan. 1978) (providing the first 
challenge to the new regulations brought by the NCAA, which originally only covered 
male intercollegiate athletes), rev’d, 622 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1980); Leffel v. Wis. 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (providing the only 
decision not reversed on appeal to find any of the Title IX regulations were 
unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
36 34 C.F.R. pt. 106.  It remains to be seen, however, whether there will be changes as a 
result of the 2003 Department of Education’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics 
report. See infra notes 43–44. 
37 See id. § 106.8; Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999) 
(disregarding the female student’s argument that the school board had not provided its 
employees with instruction to eradicate peer sexual harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291–92 (1998) (noting that the failure to comply with the 
Title IX regulations did not automatically equate with a substantive violation of Title IX); 
Heckman, supra note 10, at 852–53. 
38 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.9. 
39 See id. § 106.8. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“Although [the college] maintained a sexual harassment policy that complied with the 
requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 106.8, the mere existence of reasonable complaint 
procedures does not insulate [the college] from liability for sexual harassment claims.”). 
40 See, e.g., Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title IX sexual harassment action for 
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regulations pertaining to the conduct of physical education 
classes;41 however, they have yielded no case law addressing the 
composition or administration of physical education classes. 
On the administrative front, the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) oversees Title IX cases.  
Historically, the OCR has maintained a low profile in advocating 
Title IX.  Preceding Assistant Secretaries include: Clarence 
Thomas (Reagan Administration), now an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court; Michael Thomas (George Bush Administration); 
and Norma Cantu (Clinton Administration).  During 2001, 
President George W. Bush nominated Gerald A. Reynolds for 
Assistant Secretary of the OCR and appointed him to the position 
in March 2002.42  On June 27, 2002 (four days after the thirtieth 
anniversary of Title IX), Secretary Roderick R. Paige announced 
the formation of a fifteen-person “Commission on Opportunity in 
Athletics” to study Title IX and its application to athletics and 
 
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted); Pfeiffer v. Sch. Bd. for Marion 
Ctr. Area, 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s finding that plaintiff 
was denied access to NHS for engaging in premarital sex, not because of her pregnancy, 
and, therefore, Title IX did not provide relief); Darian v. Univ. of Mass. at Boston, 980 F. 
Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 2000) (denying a pregnant nursing student’s claim that she was 
subject to Title IX discrimination where she alleged her difficult pregnancy interfered 
with her courses); Middlebrooks v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, 980 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 
1997) (holding that a female student terminated from a doctorate program, after failing to 
pass a minimum number of qualifying tests, did not establish a prima facie Title IX case), 
aff’d, 166 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir. 1999); Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1996) (ruling there was no violation of Title IX where a female coed was 
suspended for violating this private college’s policy prohibiting pre-marital sex, absent 
evidence that males would not have been similarly suspended); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 
863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (granting summary judgment against a plaintiff 
claiming Kent State discriminated against her by issuing her a grade of incomplete after 
she became pregnant), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Andriakos v. Univ. of S. Ind., 
867 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (granting summary judgment against a male plaintiff’s 
Title IX claim of sex discrimination by a nursing school professor), aff’d, 19 F.3d 21 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Heckman, supra note 34, at 552–55 (elaborating on these decisions). 
41 34 C.F.R. § 106.31–.34.  The regulations permit gender segregated physical 
education classes when the activity involves a contact sport. Id. § 106.34.  This tracks the 
language found in Title IX regulations governing extracurricular athletic activities that 
allows separate teams. See id. § 106.41(b). 
42 DOE, Reynolds to Direct the Office for Civil Rights (June 25, 2001), http://www.ed. 
gov/PressReleases/06-2001/06252001a.html. 
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directed the release of a report by January 31, 2003.43  The reason 
for the compressed timeframe is unknown.  Public hearings were 
held in Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Colorado Springs, 
Colorado and San Diego, California.  The commission’s non-
binding report was issued on February 28, 2003.44 
II. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ON BEHALF OF STUDENT-ATHLETES 
Title IX has become synonymous with expanding participation 
opportunities for female student-athletes.45  While there is no 
constitutional requirement that any educational institution provide 
extracurricular athletic opportunities, Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title IX concerns may arise when separate athletic programs are 
provided for males and females.  The two main issues pertaining to 
student-athletes and prospective student-athletes are: (1) whether 
 
43 See Mike Allen & Valerie Strauss, Panel Named To Study Title IX; Law’s Fairness 
To Be Examined, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A27; Michael Dobie, Entitlement?, 
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 24, 2002, at B16–19; Charles McGrath, The Way We Live Now: 
9/15/02: A Whole New Ballgame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, § 6, at 21–22; DOE, 
Secretary’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, at http://www.ed.gov/inits/ 
commisionsboards/athletics/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (providing transcripts 
of the town meetings).  Remarkably, the commission was not directed toward 
interscholastic athletics. 
44 COMM’N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, “OPEN TO ALL”: TITLE IX AT THIRTY 
(2003), http://www.ed.gov/pubs/titleixat30/title9_report.pdf.  Two members of the 
commission, Julie Foudy and Donna de Varona, issued a minority report. MINORITY 
VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (2003), 
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF_ARTICLE/pdf_file/944.pdf.  
Secretary of Education Rod Paige made a statement indicating that the Department of 
Education would only move forward on recommendations unanimously approved by the 
commission. Press Release, DOE, Paige Issues Statement Regarding Final Report of 
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/ 
PressReleases/02-2003/02262003a.html. 
45 The phenomenal attendance records at the 1999 World Cup, which the United States 
women’s soccer team—composed of former collegiate players—won, was an outgrowth 
of Title IX. See Jeannine Guttman, Covering Women’s Sports Better, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, April 23, 2000, at 1C (noting that the game broke “all attendance records for 
women’s sports and [set] TV viewership records”). Cf. Neal v. Bd. Trs. Cal. State Univs., 
198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) (“And the victorious athletes understood as well as 
anyone the connection between a 27-year-old statute and tangible progress in women’s 
athletics.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Title IX has 
changed the face of women’s sports as well as our society’s interest in and attitude 
toward women athletes and women’s sports.”). 
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equal opportunity must be provided when separate teams are 
provided for males and females, and if so, what constitutes equal 
opportunity; and (2) whether students of one sex must be permitted 
to try-out and participate on the other sex’s team (“cross-over”) if 
only one team is offered.  Two Title IX regulations deal with 
athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (athletics generally),46 and 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.37(c) (distribution of athlete scholarships).47  One circuit 
court explained, “The drafters of these regulations recognized a 
situation that Congress well understood: Male athletes had been 
given an enormous head start in the race against their female 
counterparts for athletic resources, and Title IX would prompt 
universities to level the proverbial playing field.”48  The regulation 
governing “athletics generally” was the most frequently attacked of 
all the Title IX regulations during the last decade.  The statistics 
for male and female NCAA students at Division I member schools 
are 47% male students and 53% female students; compared to 59% 
male student-athletes and 41% female student-athletes, which 
represents the highest percentage ever reported for this category; 
and the corresponding figures of 57% of athletic scholarships for 
male student-athletes compared to 43% of athletic scholarships for 
female student-athletes.49 
 
46 See Heckman, supra note 25, at 397–400. 
47 See infra Part II.C. 
48 Neal, 198 F.3d at 767. 
49 See 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT 9 (2002), http://www.ncaa.org/ 
library/research/gender_equity_study/1999-00/1999-00_gender_equity_report.pdf; id. tbl. 
7, at 20.  The study provides detailed information as to the respective divisions: Divisions 
I, II and III, with a further breakdown of the subdivisions within Division I (Division I-A, 
which contains the highest profile national collegiate athletic programs; Division I-AA; 
and Division I-AAA).  While the study provides overall statistics for the percentage of 
students overall, it does not present the corresponding overall percentage of NCAA 
student-athletes, as opposed to the figures for the respective divisions.  In Division I, for 
males, the average operating expenses equated to $882,100 (64%); for females, the 
average operating expenses equated to $486,200 (36%). Id.  In Division I, for males the 
average recruiting expenses equated to $184,200 (68%); for females, the average 
recruiting expenses equated to $85,900 (32%). Id. See also infra note 168 for the average 
expenditures for athletic scholarships. 
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A. Cross-Over Cases 
The term “cross-over case” is commonly used to describe a 
case when an individual of one sex competes or wants to compete 
on an athletic team consisting of members of the other sex.  The 
Title IX regulations permit the operation of separate sex teams in 
certain situations, specifically when participation is based on 
competitive skill or when the team competes in a “contact” sport.50  
The latter was one of the primary issues litigated during the first 
twenty-five years of Title IX’s existence on the interscholastic 
level.  The regulations allow for separate teams or preclusion of 
one sex from participating on the team composed of members of 
the other sex when the sport is a contact sport.51  Contrast this with 
New York, which has issued state regulations pertaining to 
interscholastic athletics for grades seven through twelve, 
conditionally allowing females to participate on all-boys teams 
regardless of whether a female team is offered or not offered.52 
 
50 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2002). 
a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from 
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any 
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a 
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on 
such basis. 
b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for 
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon 
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.  However, 
where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for 
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members 
of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have 
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed 
to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact 
sport.  For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, 
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the 
purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact. 
Id. § 106.41(a)–(b). See also Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 693 
(6th Cir. 2000) (“All [Title IX] and the implementing regulations require is equality of 
athletic opportunity.  The statute does not require gender balance.  Further, in certain 
instances, separate teams for males and females are allowed.”) (citing Title IX and 34 
C.F.R. § 106.41(b)). 
51 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
52 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c) (2003).  A review panel 
rules on the student’s “fitness” to participate in mixed competition for certain sports 
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In recent years, there continues to be little judicial action 
involving cross-over cases.53  In Barnett v. Texas Wrestling 
Ass’n,54 female members of two high school varsity coed wrestling 
teams were banned from competing against male wrestlers by the 
state interscholastic wrestling association.55  The district court 
ruled that there was no liability based on the Title IX regulation, 34 
C.F.R. § 106.41(b), which clearly identifies wrestling as a “[t]he 
quintessential contact sport.”56  Nonetheless, the females’ request 
for injunctive relief was granted predicated on violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 
If a sport was deemed a contact sport, then the presumption 
under the regulations was that the other sex may be legally 
excluded from participation.  In Mercer v. Duke University,57 a 
female place kicker alleged sex discrimination when she was not 
selected for the football team, one of the specifically enumerated 
contact sports in the Title IX regulations.58  The parties did not 
 
(which goes beyond Title IX’s enumerated “contact” sports).  The review panel consists 
of the school physician and a physical education teacher appointed by the principal and, 
if desired, a physician appointed by the student.  Decisions will be based on majority 
vote. Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(2).  The identified sports are baseball, basketball, boxing, 
wrestling, field hockey, football, ice hockey, lacrosse, rugby, soccer, softball, speedball, 
team hand ball, and power volleyball (where the height of the net is set at less than eight 
feet). Id.  While the fitness criteria is another barrier to female participation, female 
student-athletes are beginning to participate on these teams in New York, and cannot be 
automatically excluded as a student can under Title IX.  Where separate teams are offered 
for males and females, then females may participate on all-male teams; however, males 
may be prohibited from being on all-female teams. Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(3).  When only 
one team is provided in a particular sport, females may participate on all-male teams; 
however, males may be prohibited “upon a finding that such participation would have a 
significant adverse effect.” Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(4). 
53 See Heckman, supra note 25, at 398 n.34 (listing cross-over decisions involving both 
females and males).   
54 16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998). See also Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 
(D. Kan. 1996). 
55 Barnett, 16 F. Supp. at 692. 
56 Id. at 694–95. 
57 32 F. Supp. 2d  836 (M.D.N.C. 1998), rev’d, 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).  Heather 
Sue Mercer reportedly did not want to sue Duke, but only wanted an apology.  During 
August 2001, Ashley Martin would go on to become the first female to score a point in a 
Division I football game, where she kicked two extra points for Jacksonville State 
University, located in Alabama. See Assoc. Press, Female Kicker Breaks Gender Barrier, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, § D, at 6, col. 1. 
58 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2002). 
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contest that football at the university was a coed team, although no 
females had ever participated on the team.  The North Carolina 
district court granted the university’s motion for summary 
judgment, determining that the regulation did not contain an 
exception for any particular position that may not require physical 
contact.59  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court unanimously 
reversed the district court’s determination reinstating the case.60  It 
reviewed the “separate teams” subsection and noted that Duke 
University had allowed this female to try-out for a decidedly coed 
contact sport team.  The Fourth Circuit recognized that subsection 
(a) and subsection (b) of the regulation “stand in a symbiotic 
relationship to one another.”61 
We therefore construe the second sentence of subsection 
(b) as providing that in non-contact sports, but not in 
contact sports, covered institutions must allow members of 
an excluded sex to try out for single-sex teams.  Once an 
institution has allowed a member of one sex to try out for a 
team operated by the institution for the other sex in a 
contact sports, subsection (b) is simply no longer 
applicable, and the institution is subject to the general anti-
discrimination provision of subsection (a).62 
On remand, the eight-person North Carolina jury awarded 
Mercer $1 in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive 
damages.63  The verdict represents the first case awarding punitive 
damages in a Title IX athletics-related case.  During 2001, the 
North Carolina district court judge rejected the university’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law.64  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
 
59 Mercer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 840.  Although football rules insulate a place kicker from 
direct contact, incidental contact may occur. 
60 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999). 
61 Id. at 646. 
62 Id. at 647–48 (emphasis supplied).  “Where, as here, however, the university invites 
women into what appellees characterize as the ‘traditionally all-male bastion of collegiate 
football,’ . . . we are convinced that this reading of the regulation is the only one 
permissible under law.” Id. at 648. 
63 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535 (M.D.N.C. 2001), vacated in part 
by 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002). 
64 Id. at 525. 
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ruled recently that punitive damages were not recoverable in a 
Title IX action.65 
B. Equal Opportunity 
Another subdivision of the Title IX regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(c), mandates “equal opportunity”66 in the provision of 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs where separate 
programs are provided for males and females based on the first 
enumerated program area listed.67  Remarkably, despite the 
 
65 Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 643.  The Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion based on 
an intervening Supreme Court decision in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) 
(concluding that punitive damages were not available in private causes of action seeking 
redress based on two federal civil rights laws prohibiting disability discrimination which 
relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VI]).  The Fourth 
Circuit noted that Title IX was predicated upon Title VI; thus, the court reached the same 
conclusion for a Title IX action. Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 643. 
66 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2002). 
c) Equal Opportunity.  A recipient that operates or sponsors interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes.  In determining whether equal 
opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members 
of both sexes; 
(2)  The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(3)  Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4)  Travel and per diem allowance; 
(5)  Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
(6)  Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7)  Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; 
(8)  Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 
(9)  Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; 
(10) Publicity. 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal 
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors 
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the 
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for 
teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each 
sex. 
Id. 
67 See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Action in Intercollegiate 
Athletics During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT 
C. L. REV. 953 (discussing in-depth the quartet of significant equal opportunity cases all 
commenced by female student-athletes: Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 
1996); Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); and Favia v. Univ. of 
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passage of thirty years, the legal discourse has centered almost 
exclusively on the first program area delineated. 
1. Female Olympic Athletes 
In a fascinating case of first impression, a New York federal 
district court ruled, in Sternberg v. U.S.A. National Karate-Do 
Federation,68 that Title IX applies to American Olympic athletes 
involved with the Karate-Do Federation, a national governing 
body.  The court found that an educational program or activity was 
involved and that the defendant was a recipient of federal funds.69  
The Karate-Do Federation did not receive any direct federal 
funding, however, in 1999 the United States Olympic Committee 
provided over $40 million to all national governing bodies, 
including the Karate-Do Federation.70 
2. Female Student-Athletes 
During the early 1990s, females struggled to obtain or maintain 
sports teams.71  The battle over when female varsity teams must be 
retained or club teams elevated to varsity status was fought on the 
intercollegiate level.  The inquiry into the appropriate benefits and 
conditions afforded to female sports teams has recently begun 
judicial exploration in the interscholastic arena.72 
 
Ind. at Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)).  The First Circuit decision in the 
Cohen case—addressing the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the University 
and expounding on a permanent injunction issued against the University—has emerged 
as the bellwether decision in the past thirty years on the issue of providing equal 
opportunity to student-athletes. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 155. 
68 123 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
69 See id. at 662. 
70 See id. at 663. 
71 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Title IX has enhanced, and will continue to enhance, women’s opportunities to enjoy 
the thrill of victory, the agony of defeat, and the many tangible benefits that flow from 
just being given a chance to participate in intercollegiate athletics.”); Sternberg, 123 F. 
Supp. 2d at 663; Heckman, supra note 67, at 966–94. 
72 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (2002).  Gender equity is still woefully lacking in 
media coverage, whether it is television, print, or radio broadcasting. See infra note 147 
(regarding the CBS contract with the NCAA to televise the men’s Division I basketball 
tournament (without also broadcasting the women’s basketball tournament)).  Rarely are 
women featured on the back pages of the sports coverage in newspapers, and most papers 
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a) Intercollegiate Athletics 
The two pivotal actions during the last few years in this area73 
were the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Cohen v. Brown 
University,74 the leading case in the area of athletics equal 
opportunity, and decision in National College Athletic Ass’n v. 
Smith.75  The Cohen case, originally commenced during 1992, was 
brought by female student-athletes on the women’s varsity 
 
report male teams’ scores without any gender identification, e.g., “Maryland beats 
Indiana,” whereas the female teams are specifically identified as the “girls” basketball 
team.  Sports Illustrated has historically been dismal when it comes to featuring female 
athletes on the cover of this magazine; instead, it continues to vamp its “swimsuit issue” 
with a female model (routinely not even a female athlete) on its cover.  During 1999, a 
new magazine was launched, Sports Illustrated for Women. See Keith L. Alexander, 
“Women’s Sports” Folds as Niche Gets Redefined, USA TODAY, July 3, 2000, at 8B. The 
magazine is now defunct. See David Carr, Time Inc.’s Closing Sports Illustrated for 
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, § C, at 7.  Female sportscasters for men’s athletic 
events and even on the nightly news sports section also remain in small supply.  It was 
not until 1987 that Gayle Sierens became the first woman to do play-by-play in a NFL 
game, see Tom Weir, 20th Century: This Day in Sports, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1999, at 
3C; in 1996, Robin Roberts became the first woman to anchor a network NFL studio 
show. Donna Lopiano, The Year of the Woman in Sports, SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 30, 1996. 
See also infra notes 195–203 concerning the lack of progress for female employees in 
NCAA intercollegiate programs. 
73 See  Martha Ackmann, Years Later, Maker of a Landmark Film Still Stands Up for 
Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2000, § 8, col. 1, at 11 (addressing the documentary, A 
Hero for Daisy, about the struggles of the women’s crew team at Yale University); 
Heckman, supra note 25, at 420 n.142 (identifying applicable cases). 
74 520 U.S. 1186 (1997), denying cert. to 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the 
district court’s granting of a permanent injunction in favor of the female student-athletes, 
but remanding on the lower court’s compliance plan, so as to allow the University to 
posit a satisfactory one). See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(trial seeking  reinstitution of two women’s varsity teams that began on September 26, 
1994; case partially settled on September 28, 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 
185 (D.R.I. 1995) (ruling that the university violated Title IX and ordering the defendant 
to submit a compliance plan within 120 days, but staying the directive pending an 
appeal), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996); Heckman, supra 
note 34, at 565 n.103) (explaining this ruling).  The district court judge modified his 
March 29, 1995 judgment, Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 185, in the following respects: 
reducing the time to submit a compliance plan from 120 to 60 days and eliminating the  
provision which allowed for a stay pending the appeal.  The University appealed the 
modified order. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Cohen, 101 F.3d 
155 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), 
aff’d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s granting of the 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction retaining the two women’s varsity teams). 
75 525 U.S. 459 (1998). 
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gymnastics and volleyball teams seeking to forestall the 
elimination of their teams.76  On June 23, 1998, the parties settled 
the Cohen case, subject to court approval,77 which was granted.  
The settlement required Brown University to provide athletic 
opportunities for females in close proportion to the percentage of 
female students (within a 3.5% range).78 
In Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,79 Renee M. 
Smith, a female graduate student who still had NCAA eligibility, 
wanted to play on her graduate schools’ volleyball teams.  She had 
the two graduate schools (Hofstra University and University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law) seek waivers from the NCAA, which 
had a rule that the individual must play at the same institution as 
the student’s undergraduate institution.  The NCAA denied the 
waivers for her continued athletic eligibility.  Smith contended that 
the rejected waiver requests resulted in sex discrimination by the 
NCAA pursuant to Title IX, as allegedly more male student-
athletes were afforded waivers than female student-athletes; and 
secondly, that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act.80  
 
76 Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 978. 
77 See Joint Agreement, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (No. 
92-CV-197), aff’d, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), http://www.tlpj.org/briefs/010-
Cohen.pdf.  The agreement called for the retention of thirteen varsity women’s teams as 
university-funded teams for the academic years 1998–99 through 2000–01. See id. § II.B, 
at 4–5.  While volleyball was one of the included teams, gymnastics was relegated to a 
donor-funded team. See id. § II.B, D,  at 4–5.  Moreover, the percentage of female 
students to female student-athletes must be within 3.5% in each academic year from 
1998–99 through 2000–01. See id. § III.A.1, at 6–7. 
78 See id. § III.A.1, at 6–7. To date, there is no court decision expounding on the 
minimum differential that the judiciary will accept to satisfy Title IX’s substantial 
proportionality requirement. 
79 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
80 Id. at 182 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).  The Third Circuit held the NCAA’s 
“[e]ligibility rules are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities . . . 
[thus] the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility 
requirements.” Id. at 185.  In 1991, the NCAA instituted a rule aimed at cost-cutting that 
restricted earnings for certain assistant coaches to $12,000 during the school year and 
$4,000 during the summer.  A group of the affected coaches instituted a successful 
lawsuit against the NCAA based on violation of the Sherman Act.  The parties settled the 
suit in March of 1999 for $54.5 million. Associated Press, NCAA Settles Suit for $54.5 
Million, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), March 10, 1999, at A76.  The Association of Intercollegiate 
Athletics for Women, the former governing body of women’s collegiate athletics, 
brought a lawsuit against the NCAA unsuccessfully alleging violation of the Sherman 
Act. Ass’n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
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Procedurally, the defendant-NCAA sought a motion to dismiss the 
original complaint brought by the pro se plaintiff, which the 
district court granted.81  Smith (this time with counsel) sought 
appellate review.  The Third Circuit held that the NCAA would be 
governed by Title IX because it collected dues from its member 
colleges and universities, which received federal funds.82  
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the lower court’s holding that the 
NCAA rule was not in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust 
statutes.83  A month after oral argument, the Supreme Court 
quickly and unanimously disposed of the appeal, reversing the 
appellate court on the issue of whether the NCAA was a recipient 
of federal funds,84 and remanded for further consideration. 
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,85 the Louisiana 
district court had the opportunity to hear a case where the female 
plaintiffs sought elevation of two club teams, soccer and softball, 
to varsity status.  The district court found the university had 
 
558 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 735 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Bowers 
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497–98 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing a 
female learning-disabled student’s claim against the NCAA for violation of the Sherman 
Act). 
81 Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 978 F. Supp. 213, 220 (W.D. Pa. 1997), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vated in part by 139 F. 3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated by 
525 U.S. 459 (1999).  The plaintiff also moved to amend her complaint, which the district 
court denied. Id. at 221. 
82 Smith, 139 F.3d at 187.  Generally, athletic associations have been buffered from 
Title IX jurisdiction, as the associations did not directly receive federal funds. See 
Heckman, supra note 3, at 35 n.157. But see Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 
C-92-CV-295 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 43 F.3d 265, 272 
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the state interscholastic athletic association was subject to 
Title IX). See also Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 
1001, 1008 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding that whether this state high school athletic 
association was a recipient of federal funds was a question of fact). 
83 Smith, 139 F.3d at 187. 
84 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999).  The inquiry was 
whether funds the NCAA received for its National Youth Sports Program would be 
sufficient to trigger Title IX jurisdiction. Id. at 469–70.  The Court noted, “[u]nlike the 
earmarked student aid in Grove City, there is no allegation that NCAA members paid 
their dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose.” Id. at 468. See also Cureton v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (concerning whether the 
NCAA received federal funds to garner Title VI jurisdiction). 
85 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) (finding that the University violated Title IX, and 
ordering submission of a compliance action plan), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and 
vacated in part by 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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violated Title IX.86  Subsequently, on March 4, 1997, the court 
denied the state university’s motion to dismiss,87 which it had 
raised based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in the 
Seminole Tribe case.88  During May 1997, the district court finally 
accepted a university-proposed compliance plan.89  On July 1, 
1997, the court entered final judgment in this case.90  In 
determining whether the selection of sports, identified in the first 
program area, was satisfied, the court referenced the three-part 
“effective accommodation test” found in the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation.91  The educational institution that provides separate 
athletic programs for male and female student-athletes must meet 
one of the three prongs found in the test.  The first prong requires 
 
86 Id. at 917. 
87 See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 2000). 
88 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See also Heckman, supra note 
10, at 856–57. 
89 See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 865. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. at 879. 
C.  Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities. 
  . . .  
5.  Application of the Policy—Levels of Competition.  In effectively 
accommodating the interests and abilities of male and female 
athletes, institutions must provide the opportunity for individuals of 
each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for athletes 
of each sex to have competitive team schedules, which equally reflect 
their abilities. 
a.  Compliance will be assessed in any one of the following ways: 
(1)   Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for 
male and female students are provided in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; 
or 
(2)  Where the members of one sex have been and are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether 
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to 
the developing interest and abilities of the members of that 
sex; or 
(3)   Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a 
continuing practice or program expansion such as that cited 
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and 
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and 
effectively accommodated by the present program. 
Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
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substantial proportionality between the percentage of students and 
the percentage of student-athletes of the same sex.92  The second 
prong demands a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion, while the third prong directs that the current program 
fully and effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of 
the underrepresented gender.93  The district court eschewed the 
application of the first prong of the three-prong effective 
accommodation test94 that had been sanctioned by the First, Third, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.95  The 
Fifth Circuit decision ultimately upheld the use of the entire 
effective accommodation test.96 
Significantly, another district court sided with the Pederson 
district court in rejecting use of the first prong.  The California 
district court in Neal v. Board of Trustees California State 
University, enunciated, “[T]he Pederson court’s rejection of the 
safe harbor test, is sensible.  This court essentially finds that the 
safe harbor rule is not dictated by the Policy Interpretation and is 
inconsistent with the text, structure and policy of Title IX itself.”97  
 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id; Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, and vacated in part by 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
Under the Policy Interpretation, an educational institution which is proved not 
to be effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of the 
underrepresented sex but is able to demonstrate a history and continuing 
practice of program expansion demonstrably responsive to the developing 
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex may still be found to be in 
compliance with Title IX. 
Id. at 916. 
95 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Today, we join our sister circuits in holding that Title IX does not bar universities from 
taking steps to ensure that women are approximately as well represented in sports 
programs as they are in student bodies.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 
1996); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. 
Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 
824 (10th Cir. 1993); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1992); Heckman, 
supra note 25, at 408 n.83. 
96 Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit would 
also condone the effective accommodation test. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 763. 
97 Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. CV-F-97-5009, 1997 WL 1524813, at 
*12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 1997), rev’d, 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Heckman, 
supra note 67, at 993 (concerning the consent decree entered into by the California State 
Universities). 
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However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected this 
position, noting that the Pederson district court’s rejection of the 
first prong was found in the dicta.  The appellate court stated: 
As is explained above, those courts emphasized that 
women’s interest in sports appeared to be lower than 
men’s, but that the genders’ interests were slowly but 
surely converging, which was precisely the reason why 
requiring only that each gender’s expressed interest in 
participating be accommodated equally would freeze the 
inequality of the status quo.98 
In Boucher v. Syracuse University,99 the district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant-university and dismissed the 
Title IX claims of female student-athletes.  The court found that 
Syracuse University had satisfied the second prong of Title IX with 
a continuing history of program expansion as the university had 
current plans to add more intercollegiate athletic teams for female 
students.100  This is the first court to make such an affirmative 
finding.  The students appealed.  The Second Circuit determined 
that the district court, in this class action, should have sanctioned 
classes representing the female lacrosse players and softball 
players.101 
 
98 Neal, 198 F.3d at 768.  Moreover, “Adopting [the university’s] interest-based test for 
Title IX compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady increases in 
women’s participation and interest in sports that have followed Title IX’s enactment.” Id. 
at 769.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “We adopt the reasoning of Cohen I, Cohen 
II, and Kelley, and hold that the constitutional analysis contained therein persuasively 
disposes of any serious constitutional concerns that might be raised in relation to the 
OCR Policy Interpretation.” Id. at 772. 
99 No. 95-CV-620, 1998 WL 167296 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) (mem.) (reviewing the 
entire history of the university’s athletic programs and activities since the enactment of 
Title IX), aff’d in part, dismissed as moot in part, and vacated in part by 164 F.3d 113 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
100 See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) (setting out 
the second prong of the effective accommodation test). 
101 Boucher, 164 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1999).  The Second Circuit also directed that 
since the University had agreed to sponsor a women’s varsity softball team, the order as 
to forming a sub-class for the female softball players would be deemed in temporary 
abeyance, awaiting the actual implementation of this team. Id. 
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Both male and female student-athletes instituted the lawsuit in 
Harper v. Board of Regents, Illinois State University,102 where two 
female students alleged sex discrimination based on the 
elimination of men’s athletic teams to achieve Title IX 
proportionality rather that the addition of three more women’s 
teams.  The court held: 
[The] two named [female] plaintiffs lacked standing to 
bring a claim for failing to add a women’s Rugby team to 
the ISU athletic roster under Title IX.  Title IX does not 
require ISU to add women’s teams, in particular Rugby 
teams; it merely requires ‘equal opportunity’ for both male 
and female athletes who are students.103 
Thus, the court dismissed this count with prejudice.104  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of the university’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to the men’s Title IX 
claim.105   
On March 16, 1998, the district court in Grandson v. 
University of Minnesota106 denied the defendant-university’s 
motion to dismiss the complaint in an action brought concerning 
allegations of discriminatory funding of the women’s soccer team, 
including the lack of an athletic scholarship.  There was also a 
companion action brought in Thompson v. University of Minnesota 
at Duluth,107 in which a similar result was reached in denying the 
defendant-university’s motion to dismiss in this action seeking a 
women’s varsity ice hockey team.  Subsequently, the trial court 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs in Grandson and Thompson did not 
 
102 No. 95-CV-1371 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1997) (granting in part and denying in part the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
103 Id., slip op. at 33–34. 
104 Id. at 34. 
105 Harper v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. State Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (C.D. Ill. 1999), 
aff’d sub nom. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of Ill. State Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 
1999). See also infra text accompanying notes 151–152. 
106 No. 97-CV-265 (D. Minn. March 16, 1998), aff’d, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002). 
107 No. 97-CV-1072 (D. Minn. March 16, 1998), aff’d sub nom. Grandson v. Univ. of 
Minn., 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002). 
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have standing to sue.108  The plaintiffs in both these cases filed 
appeals, which were consolidated.109 
Finally, on November 20, 2001, the Eighth Circuit reviewed 
the three main issues advanced in the two cases.  First, it ruled that 
the plaintiffs’ request for the university to provide a women’s 
varsity hockey team was properly deemed moot, since the 
university now offered the team.110  Second, the plaintiffs sought to 
amend their Title IX lawsuit as a class action alleging unequal 
treatment of female student-athletes; the appellate court upheld as 
appropriate the district court’s decision dismissing claims based on 
failure to timely serve requests for class certification.111  Third, one 
plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to request damages for 
failure of the university to award her a soccer scholarship.  The 
appellate court again affirmed the lower court’s denial of a request 
to amend damages was proper where there “was no allegation of 
prior notice of their complaints to appropriate [University of 
Minnesota at Duluth (UMD)] officials, no allegation of deliberate 
indifference by such officials, and no allegation they had afforded 
UMD a reasonable opportunity to rectify the alleged violations.”112 
In 1998, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 
the Supreme Court issued its stern standard to be applied in Title 
IX cases involving sexual harassment claims made by a student 
against an educational institution for actions of a teacher: 
“[D]amages may not be recovered in those circumstances unless an 
 
108 See id.; Grandson, No. 97-CV-265.  The appellants’ briefs indicated that the 
university announced the creation of a women’s varsity hockey team and athletic 
scholarships for the women’s soccer team only after the female students had filed their 
lawsuits.  Appellants’ Reply Brief & Supplemental Addendum, at 3–4, Grandson, 272 
F.3d at 568 (No. 99-1817) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief].  The plaintiffs’ motion to 
amend the complaint had been denied.  In light of the Gebser requirements, Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998), the students argued that actual notice 
of the Title IX discrimination came from students, women’s groups and the university’s 
own employees. Appellants’ Brief at 10.  The students, who sought creation of a 
women’s varsity ice hockey team, stated, “Failure to address complaints of gender 
discrimination under Title IX until after a lawsuit has been filed is the very epitome of 
deliberate indifference.” Id. at 13. 
109 Grandson, 272 F.3d at 568. 
110  Id. at 574. 
111  Id. 
112 Id. at 575. 
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official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to 
institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual 
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s 
misconduct.”113  The Eighth Circuit applied the Gebser standard 
arising from a Title IX sexual harassment lawsuit to a Title IX 
athletics equal opportunity lawsuit: “When an individual plaintiff 
such as Grandson claims money damages from a specific Title IX 
violation, such as failing to award her a soccer scholarship, Gebser 
requires prior notice to a university official with authority to 
address the complaint and a response demonstrating indifference to 
the alleged violation.”114  This appellate court specifically rejected 
any of the following actions as satisfying the notice requirement: 
the prior filing of an administrative complaint with the OCR;115 the 
student’s complaint to the director of UMD’s Office of Equal 
Opportunity,116 as this was after she had quit the women’s varsity 
soccer team; and UMD’s allegedly “[c]onsistently unequal 
expenditures for its men’s and women’s athletic teams[, which was 
not] sufficient evidence of the deliberate indifference required by 
Gebser.”117  The plaintiffs in Grandson unsuccessfully sought final 
appellate review by the Supreme Court.118   
Despite many cases seeking certiorari, the Supreme Court has 
never reviewed a Title IX lawsuit challenging a transgression of 
 
113 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. 
114 Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576. See also Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 
539–40 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (finding that female student-athlete had properly placed the 
university on notice). 
115 Id. at 575. 
116 See id. at 576. 
117 Id.  Remarkably, female college students had been successful in all Title IX lawsuits 
initiated within the past thirty years except for this recent Eighth Circuit decision.  
Grandson appears to be the first post-Gebser decision to apply the standard articulated by 
the Supreme Court in a Title IX sexual harassment case where neither the statute nor 
implementing regulations mentioned sexual harassment, as opposed to traditional sex 
discrimination, as it involves separate athletic programs voluntarily provided by 
educational institutions.  It remains to be seen whether requiring female students in non-
sexual harassment cases to meet a standard imposed in Title IX sexual harassment cases 
is the proper analysis.  Imposing the strict Gebser standard to equal opportunity matters 
will certainly prove a barrier to students seeking gender equity in athletic programs some 
thirty years after the statute’s passage and where many schools have yet to achieve true 
equity for their female students despite the lengthy passage of time.  
118 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002). 
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equal opportunity in separate athletic programs provided to male 
and female student-athletes.119  During 1999, critics asserted that 
Title IX (and by implication the effective accommodation test) 
constituted a quota system, but the Honorable Norma Cantu, 
Assistant Secretary of the OCR, emphatically argued that Title IX 
was not a quota system.120 
A number of cases were settled involving female collegiate 
students.  During November 1998, female students in Seigler v. 
Presbyterian College,121 alleged unequal athletic opportunities and 
unequal distribution of athletic scholarships at the South Carolina 
college, where female students comprised 50% of the 
undergraduate population, but reflected a mere 22% as student-
athletes, and received only 18% of athletic scholarships.  The 
parties settled the lawsuit during 1999.  The settlement is notable 
because it required the college to hire a women’s softball coach 
with a salary within $3,500 of that paid to the men’s baseball 
coach, and because it required that the college not cut funding or 
facilities for the baseball team in order to implement equity for the 
softball team.122 
 
119 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 
1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
120 Norman V. Cantu, Letter to the Sports Editor, College Athletics’ Title IX Law Is Not 
a Quota System, USA TODAY, July 22, 1999, at 14A (“[Title IX] is not a quota system. . 
. .  Nothing in Title IX requires the cutting of men’s sports, and schools have viable 
alternatives for providing equal opportunity in athletics.”). See also Andrew Zimbalist, 
Backlash Against Title IX: An End Run Around Female Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Mar. 3, 2000, at B9 (“It is duplicitous for colleges and universities to accept the fruits of 
amateurism for men’s sports and then invoke business principles when it comes to 
financing women’s sports.”). 
121 No. 98-CV-3475 (D.S.C. filed Nov. 27, 1998). 
122 Settlement and Release Agreement, paras. 1, 18, Seigler v. Presbyterian Coll., No. 
98-CV-3475 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 1999).  Moreover, the college must provide over a period 
of years, at least as many scholarships in aggregate as the baseball team offers. Id. para. 
13.  The settlement details a number of factors concerning the facilities provided to the 
softball team, including the construction of permanent, stationary dugouts to 
accommodate seating for the entire softball team to be in place by January 1, 2000 (an 
extremely brief time-frame). Id. para. 3.  It also requires the college not discriminate in 
the scheduling of any summer softball camps provided on-campus. Id. para. 2. 
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During April 1997, the New York district court approved the 
settlement establishing a women’s varsity ice hockey team in 
Bryant v. Colgate University.123  During 1997, the parties settled 
the lawsuit in Carver v. St. Leo’s College,124 which was brought on 
behalf of individual female varsity softball players seeking 
retention of their sport.   
b) Interscholastic Athletics 
During Title IX’s history, there has been little legal addressing 
“equal opportunity” involving interscholastic athletics.125  In 
Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass’n, the Sixth Circuit 
found that there was no evidence of discriminatory animus to 
support a Title IX claim that the failure of the school districts to 
provide fast-pitch softball for female high school students was 
discriminatory based on gender.126  The Sixth Circuit, in this 2-1 
decision, stated that to establish intentional discrimination the 
proponents must demonstrate evidence of discriminatory animus 
versus notice or deliberate indifference, which was used in prior 
Supreme Court sexual harassment decisions.  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded, “Because of Plaintiffs’ fundamental failure to establish 
a violation of Title IX, let alone an intentional violation, we need 
not adopt any test at this time.”127  The dissent strongly opposed 
this position stating, “I believe that, short of a defendant actually 
 
123 No. 93-CV-1029, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21518 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997) (outlining 
the proposed settlement).  The following year, the court grappled with the issue of 
attorneys’ fees. Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 996 F. Supp. 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). See also 
Heckman, supra note 10, at 869. 
124 No. 96-CV-383 (M.D. Fla. settled May 22, 1997). 
125 But see Fritson v. Minden Pub. Sch., No. 95-CV-3129 (D. Neb. 1995); Liberty v. 
Holdrege Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44, No. 95-CV-3127 (D. Neb. 1995); Praster v. N. Platte 
Sch. Dist., No. 95-CV-3128 (D. Neb. 1995); Thomsen v. Fremont Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
No. 95-CV-3124 (D. Neb. 1995).  These four lawsuits were simultaneously filed on April 
5, 1995, alleging unequal opportunities and benefits for female student-athletes, including 
the non-offering of interscholastic softball teams for the females.  During 1996, the four 
cases settled with the establishment of girls’ softball teams at the respective school 
districts. 
126 206 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 2000). 
127 Id. at 692. 
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defying a court injunction, the ‘animus’ standard will almost never 
be met in a Title IX athletic-equity case.”128  The dissent found: 
[P]urported “unintentional” violations of Title IX are 
pervasive in our educational institutions even a quarter-
century after the statute’s enactment.  While much has 
changed for female athletes since the passage of Title IX, 
much remains the same . . . Because the “animus” standard 
ensures that Title IX defendants will be virtually 
impervious to a money judgment, they have little incentive 
to rectify any inequities in their athletic programs until 
judicially directed.129 
On October 2, 1996, less than eight months after the institution 
of a lawsuit, the parties in Randolph v. Owasso Independent School 
District130 agreed to a consent decree addressing the interscholastic 
sports program.  On March 8, 1996, female student-athletes filed a 
complaint in Bull v. Tulsa Public Schools131 alleging inequitable 
conditions fostered on them.  Female high school student-athletes, 
who alleged sex discrimination against the Michigan High School 
Athletic Association, were questioning whether the defendant-
association was a recipient of federal funds in Communities for 
Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n.132  In Alston v. 
Virginia High School League,133  female students prevailed in their 
 
128 Id. at 701 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). 
130 No. 96-CV-0105 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 1996). 
131 No. 96-CV-0180 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 1996). 
132 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (W.D. Mich. 1998).  The defendant, MHSAA moved for 
summary judgment, arguing it is not subject to Title IX or a state actor for Constitutional 
purposes.  The Clinton Administration’s Department of Justice filed an amicus brief 
against these positions. See also Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 
F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (addressing a number of motions by the parties, 
including whether a civil rights organization had standing to bring a Title IX lawsuit; 
whether the MHSAA, a state athletic association, was a proper party defendant; and 
whether certain named defendants, who were officials of the MHSAA could be sued in 
their individual capacity). 
133 176 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1997).  The boys’ divisions (A, AA, and AAA) all played 
in the same season, but not so for all the girls’ divisions.  The girls’ volleyball, basketball, 
and tennis teams played different seasons based on the school enrollment, while all boys’ 
teams were aligned regardless of the school size. Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, 184 
F.R.D. 574, 576 (W.D. Va. 1997) (ruling a conflict of interest prevented the female 
student-athletes from being certified as a class).  Ultimately, on July 20, 2000, each of the 
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lawsuit alleging that the state high school league violated Title IX 
with the seasonal placement scheduling of certain interscholastic 
sports for females, which differed from the boys’ teams. 
The next series of cases involving high schools in Brevard 
County, Florida, showcase the first Title IX decisions to examine 
in detail other benefits and opportunities provided to male student-
athletes, but not female student-athletes as directed by the equal 
opportunity subsection.134  Three decisions were rendered in 
Daniels v. School Board of Brevard County,135  where female 
student-athletes contended discrimination due to alleged 
inequitable benefits and conditions provided to the girls’ high 
school softball team as compared to the boys’ baseball team 
including: inequities concerning the electronic scoreboards, batting 
cages, bleachers, signs, concession stand, press box, bathroom 
facilities and field lighting.  In the November 25, 1997, decision, a 
Florida district court granted the female students a preliminary 
injunction and ordered the school board to propose a plan to rectify 
the alleged discrimination.136  The preliminary injunction did not 
 
named female student-plaintiff were awarded $17,000 by a Virginia jury. Vicari, supra 
note 18, at 15. 
134 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (2002).  For an account of an interscholastic coach 
who filed a Title IX administrative complaint seeking equitable benefits for female 
student-athletes, see Johnette Howard, Contested Terrain, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 17, 
2001 at C12–16.  The girls’ field hockey coach for over thirty-one years—and only 
female physical education teacher at the Centereach High School on Long Island, New 
York, for eighteen years—sought a team room for all female athletes similar to the 2,929-
square-foot-facility provided to the boys; the girls’ room measured 1,040 square feet. See 
id. 
135 985 F. Supp. 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (granting athletes’ preliminary injunction and 
ordering the school board to propose a remedial plan) [hereinafter Daniels I]. See also 
Daniels v. School Bd. of Brevard County, Fla., 995 F. Supp. 1394 (M.D. Fla. 1997) 
(rejecting the board’s plan and granting a permanent injunction against the school board) 
[hereinafter Daniels II]; Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 958 
(M.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that Landow became the new named plaintiff in the same class 
action). 
136 Daniels I, 985 F. Supp. at 1462.  The School Board’s plan centered predominantly on 
withholding or eliminating items from the boys’ baseball team, rather than affording the 
girls’ softball team certain items. See Daniels II, 995 F. Supp. at 1396.  The court noted 
that the “School Board proposes not to spend any funds to remedy the inequities 
identified in the prior Order,” other than the installation of lights for the girls’ fields, 
which had previously been approved. Id. at 1395.  However, if the lights were not 
installed, then the board proposed disallowing the lights for the boys’ field. Id. 
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mandate the expenditure of an explicit amount of funds to rectify 
the inequities in the provision of the girls’ softball team.  In the 
December 23, 1997 decision, the court found that the terms of the 
preliminary injunction were proper.137 
In Landow v. School Board of Brevard County,138 once again 
the district court held that disparities between Brevard County’s 
girls’ softball program and the boys’ baseball program violated 
Title IX.  The girls did not have an available scoreboard, lighted 
field, a concession stand, or press box.  The court noted that the 
“softball teams are forced to ‘make do’ by playing on fields that 
are built to the dimensions of a different sport: men’s slow-pitch 
softball.  This signals to the girls that they are not as important as 
the boys.”139  An interesting aspect of the decision was the 
pronouncement that “evidence concerning whether the girls’ 
softball teams have the same ability as the boys’ baseball teams to 
raise funds through gate admission fees, concession stand 
revenues, and sales of advertising signs, is immaterial.”140  The 
court found that the absence of batting cages and a lighted field for 
females violated the provisions of Title IX regarding equipment 
and supplies and the scheduling of games and practice times.141  
The court nevertheless found the “School Board is not obligated to 
ensure absolute parity in coaching ability.”142 
 
137 See id. at 1394 (M.D. Fla. 1997).  The court identified that two class actions have 
been commenced concerning the lack of softball fields by other schools. See id. at 1397. 
138 132 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M.D. Fla. 2001).  In this class action lawsuit, the court 
analyzed Title IX on a county-wide basis versus a school-by-school basis. Id. at 962.  The 
decision also mentioned a Florida statute governing gender equity, FLA. STAT. ch. 
228.2001(2)(a) (2002) (tracking the Title IX regulation governing “equal opportunity” in 
athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)–(10) (2002)). 
139 Landow, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 964.  Thus, “the girls do not actually practice and play 
on true fast-pitch softball fields.” Id. at 960. 
140 Id. at 962. 
141 See id. at 964. 
142 Id. See also Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, No. 97-CV-1463, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7155, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2002) (approving the joint plan the parties 
submitted dated March 5, 2001, with new softball fields to be constructed at the two high 
schools). 
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3. Male Student-Athletes 
During the 1990s, Title IX was decried across the country for 
being an anathema to retention of certain men’s collegiate teams.  
Even Representative J. Dennis Hastert, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and a former wrestler, testified during 
Congressional hearings on the matter.143  Nonetheless, antagonism 
with Title IX is not a new phenomenon.  Since the Tower 
Amendment in 1974,144  individuals have sought to pierce Title IX 
overall, or at least fillet the law when it comes to interfering with 
men’s sports.145  This issue of Title IX’s applicability to men’s 
sports, but especially men’s intercollegiate athletics, has raised the 
most passion (and probably the most misinformation about what 
Title IX entails).  There has been minimal recent legal action 
involving male student-athletes, who uniformly have sought to 
forestall their teams from elimination.146  While certain men’s non-
revenue teams are sometimes slated for termination under the guise 
of achieving Title IX compliance, as previously indicated, it would 
be illuminative to ascertain the monies expended on the entire 
men’s athletic department.147  Universities continue to base 
elimination of men’s intercollegiate teams on Title IX.148 
 
143 See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Postsecondary Educ., Training & Life-Long Learning, House Comm. on Econ. & Educ. 
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 9–17 (1995) (testimony and prepared statement of Hon J. 
Dennis Hastert). 
144 See Amend. 1343 to S. 1539, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 15322 (1974) (proposing 
to eliminate revenue-generating sports from Title IX calculation). 
145 See Heckman, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
146 See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (denying 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the elimination of the men’s 
wrestling team); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993) 
(finding no Title IX violation where members of the men’s swimming team sought relief 
from having their team eliminated), aff’d, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Cooper v. 
Peterson, 626 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (granting St. Lawrence University’s 
motion to dismiss the action brought by members of the men’s wrestling team, which was 
slated for elimination); Heckman, supra note 25, at 421 n.142. 
147 See Heckman, supra note 67, at 997. The increasing escalation of costs spent on 
men’s athletic programs continues to raise ire.  The New York Times reported the 
University of Oregon purportedly spent $250,000 on a “seven-story-high billboard near 
Madison Square Garden to promote its quarterback for the Heisman Trophy.” Jodi 
Wilgoren, Spiraling Sports Budgets Draw Fire from Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 
2001, at 12.  Recently, CBS signed a $6.2 billion, eleven-year television contract to 
telecast the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. See Janis Carr, Are You Ready for 
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Men’s intercollegiate wrestling teams have been particularly 
battered.  Nonetheless, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits found no Title IX violation in cases commenced by male 
intercollegiate student-athletes.  In Harper v. Board of Regents of 
Illinois State University,149 members of the men’s soccer and 
wrestling teams commenced a lawsuit in 1995 seeking retention of 
their teams.  The district court granted in part and denied in part 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, 
including the sustaining of the Title IX cause of action, but only 
against the university and the Board of Regents.150  On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the male athletes’ stance that Title IX was 
violated, incorporating the prior Seventh Circuit decision in Kelley 
v. Board of Regents of the University of Illinois,151 which dealt 
with the elimination of the men’s swimming team, stating: 
 
Some . . . Lacrosse?: Colleges—The National Collegiate Sports Network Plans to 
Spotlight Non-Major Sports, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1.  The deal does 
not call for CBS to televise any of the women’s tournament games, not even the final 
championship game.  The latest installment of the Knight Foundation’s Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics decried the escalation of costs and advised that colleges should 
put a stop to the increasing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics.  The 
commission’s report also commented on Title IX, recommending that universities ensure 
compliance, stating, the “legitimate and long-overdue need to support women’s athletic 
programs and comply with Title IX is not used as an excuse for soaring costs while 
expenses in big time sports are unchecked.” Knight Commission on Intercollegiate 
Athletics, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education, 2001 
REP. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 27, http://www.knightfdn.org/ 
downloads/pdf/KCfinal_06-2001.pdf. See also Donna Lopiano, The Real Culprit in the 
Cutting of Men’s Olympic Sports, Women’s Sports Foundation, at 
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/opin/article.html?record= 
776 (May 10, 2001) (Lopiano, former women’s athletic director at University of Texas, 
and Executive Director of the Women’s Sports Foundation, enumerated specific 
instances of spending of men’s teams.  For example, “Following a football season in 
which a football team won seven games, the head coach treated his entire staff and their 
wives to a trip to the Bahamas.”). 
148 See, e.g., Joe Schad, Providence 9 Tells Schools: Take That!, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 
24, 1999, at A38 (Providence College, a member of the Big East Conference, apparently 
decided to drop the men’s baseball team due to Title IX.  “Providence administrators . . . 
said they had no choice but to drop the three men’s programs because the university’s 
enrollment is 58 percent female but females make up only 48 percent of the school’s 
athletes.”). 
149 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of 
Ill. State Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999). 
150 Id. 
151 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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In short, the plaintiffs-appellants attempt to draw a 
distinction between decisions in which sex is a 
consideration (as in Kelley) and decisions in which sex 
serves as the motivating factor (as in the present case). 
 We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs-appellants’ 
attempt to distinguish decisions to eliminate athletic 
programs motivated by financial concerns from those based 
on considerations of sex.  That distinction ignores the fact 
that a university’s decision as to which athletic programs to 
offer necessarily entails budgetary considerations.  For 
universities, decisions about cutting or adding athletic 
programs are based on a consideration of many factors 
including: the total size of the athletic department, which is 
governed by budgetary considerations, and the distribution 
of programs among men and women, which is governed by 
Title IX concerns.  To say that one decision is financial, 
while another is sex-based, assumes that these two aspects 
can be neatly separated.  They cannot.  Absent financial 
concerns, Illinois State University presumably would rather 
have added women’s programs while keeping its men’s 
programs intact.  Similarly, in the absence of Title IX 
concerns, the University of Illinois in Kelley would have 
cut both its men’s and women’s swimming programs in 
order to save money. Ultimately, both the decision of the 
University in this case and the decision of the University of 
Illinois at issue in Kelley were based on a combination of 
financial and sex-based concerns that are not easily 
distinguished.152 
Application of the first prong of the three-part effective 
accommodation test was at issue in the next case, also brought by 
male wrestlers, where the district court had eschewed application 
of the substantial proportionality comparison found in the first 
prong.  On December 15, 1999, the Ninth Circuit in Neal v. Board 
of Trustees of the California State Universities,153 reversed the 
 
152 Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 637. 
153 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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California district court’s refusal to provide the first prong with 
“safe harbor” status.154 
Male wrestlers were not successful in maintaining their team in 
Chalenor v. University of North Dakota,155  despite the fact that 
there were sufficient funds.  Male students were overwhelmingly 
represented as student-athletes at this state university, and thus met 
the first prong of the effective accommodation test. 
In Miami University Wrestling Club v. Miami University,156 
male wrestlers at this university located in Ohio were unsuccessful 
in pursuing a complaint alleging violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title IX to retain their 
team.  On March 24, 2000, the Ohio district court dismissed the 
Title IX action against both the university and individually-named 
defendants and also dismissed the equal protection claim against 
the university.  On January 24, 2001, the court dismissed the equal 
protection claims asserted against the individually-named 
defendants and denied the wrestlers’ motion for reconsideration of 
the court’s rejection of their Title IX claim against the university.  
 
154 Id. at 768. 
155 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D.N.D. 2000), aff’d, 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).  The 
Eighth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the January 16, 1996 letter of 
Assistant Secretary Cantu indicating that “an institution can choose which part of the test 
it plans to meet.” Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1045.  The court further stated that “a public 
university cannot avoid its legal obligations by substituting funds from private sources for 
funds from tax revenues.  Once a university receives a monetary donation the fund 
becomes public money, subject to Title IX’s legal obligations in their disbursement.” Id. 
at 1048.  The Eighth Circuit has yet to rule on application of the three-prong effective 
accommodation test.  In this decision, while the appellate court indicated that the 1979 
policy interpretation should be accorded a “controlling deference,” id. at 1047, it 
nonetheless withheld its judicial imprimatur stating, “The validity of the interpretation 
was not put in question before the District Court, so the Court relied, as it was supposed 
to, on that interpretation.  As we are not presented with that issue here, consideration of it 
will have to await another day.” Id.  The Eighth Circuit also did not reach application of 
the policy interpretation in Grandson v. University of Minnesota, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 
2001), due to the court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to satisfy a notice 
requirement. 
156 195 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff’d, 802 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002).  The 
men’s wrestling, tennis, and soccer teams were slated for elimination.  The university 
indicated that elimination of the three men’s teams was being done to comply with Title 
IX.  During 1999, the school agreed to provide the male wrestlers with athletic 
scholarships during the tenure.  The Center for Individual Rights represented the 
plaintiffs. Id. 
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In addressing classifications based on gender pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the court noted: 
The objective explicitly underlying both Title IX and the 
challenged actions of the individual Defendants herein is 
the elimination of the effects of past discrimination against 
women in publicly funded athletic programs, particularly 
those administered by public educational institutions.  That 
objective is borne out in the legislative history of Title IX 
and in the unequivocal evidence of record in this matter.157 
On the motion for reconsideration as to the Title IX claim, the 
court stated: 
The [Sixth Circuit] Court of Appeals noted in its Horner II 
decision that Title IX does not require strict gender parity 
but rather the equal accommodation of interest by male and 
female students in athletic participation and 
opportunities . . . [T]o state a claim under Title IX, . . . a 
plaintiff must allege that an institution receiving public 
funding has failed to provide equal athletic opportunities by 
gender . . . Plaintiffs make no such allegation.158 
Thus, the court found that even if it had relied to some extent on 
the policy interpretation to support its earlier determination, the 
failure by the plaintiffs to properly advance a prima facie Title IX 
claim rendered the claim ultimately defective.159  The court 
emphasized, “Equal accommodation of the athletic abilities and 
interests of the sexes ought to be the ultimate objective of any 
program or policy related to athletic opportunities at publicly 
funded institutions.”160  The court also found that, “Calculations of 
relative interest in athletic participation will often be skewed by 
imbalances in the number of students recruited to the institution 
specifically for their athletic ability and interest.”161 
 
157 Id. at 1016. 
158 Id. at 1018. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1019.  The court continued, the “most obvious method of accounting for the 
skewing effect of an imbalance caused by disparities in opportunities currently available 
is to provide equal opportunities on the basis of numerical proportionality and then to 
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During January of 2002, in National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n 
v. Department of Education,162 members of various collegiate 
wrestling associations commenced a lawsuit against the 
Department of Education challenging that the Title IX regulations, 
specifically the two governing athletics, and the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation, which yields the “effective accommodation test” 
were not properly approved by the President in violation of section 
902 of the statute.163 
C. Athletic Scholarships 
Another section of the Title IX Regulations instructs on the 
provision of athletic scholarships.  34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c), states: 
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic 
scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide 
reasonable opportunities for such awards for 
members of each sex in proportion to the number of 
students of each sex participating in interscholastic 
or intercollegiate athletics. 
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for 
members of each sex may be provided as part of 
separate athletic teams for members of each sex to 
the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 
106.41.164 
 
consider lingering interest among non-participating students when making future 
decisions regarding the provision of athletic opportunities.” Id. 
162 No. 02-CV-00072 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2002).  The Department of Education 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which was scheduled for submission during June 
2002. 
163 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000): 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any educational program or activity . . . is authorized and 
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such 
program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
application which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the 
statute . . . .  No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless 
and until approved by the President. 
Id. 
164 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (2002). 
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During Title IX’s first twenty-five years, there has been only 
one judicial decision concerning the application of this regulation 
with the distribution of athletic scholarships by educational 
institutions.165  Male wrestlers unsuccessfully sought judicial 
intervention to prohibit the reduction of certain scholarships for 
their sport in Neal v. Board of Trustees of the California State 
Universities.166  While not dealing with the required distribution of 
athletic scholarships, in Beasley v. Alabama State University,167 a 
female volleyball player alleged Title IX discrimination for being 
mistreated for an injury which resulted in the revocation of her 
athletic scholarship.  Significantly, during 1998, the OCR informed 
its constituency that a one percent differential between the 
percentage of athletes of one sex and the percentage of athletic 
scholarships—or one scholarship differential—will be tolerated.168  
One counsel commented, “The failure of the NCAA and OCR to 
cooperate in developing a realistic mechanism for accommodating 
institutional efforts in achieving gender-equity in scholarships is 
puzzling and disturbing.”169 
 
165 See Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (granting the 
university’s motion for summary judgment); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 
(S.D. Iowa 1994) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction which sought 
the prevention of the university’s intention to eliminate the men’s wrestling team). 
166 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Brian A. Snow, Broadening the Demand for 
Gender-Equity in Athletics: Financial Aid and Coaches’ Compensation, 130 EDUC. L. 
REP. 965, 967 n.9 (1999) (The court issued a temporary restraining order—which was 
vacated on appeal—on the wrestlers’ behalf that would prevent the university from 
trimming the number of athletic scholarships for this male team.  Mr. Snow was counsel 
to Colorado State University in Roberts v. Colorado State University, 998 F.2d 824 (10th 
Cir. 1993).). 
167 966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (concerning application of the statute of 
limitations).  The court reported Beasley’s claims that she was a recruited to play 
volleyball at the state university with a promise of an athletic scholarship, which did not 
materialize during her freshman year due to a lack of allocated funds for this team, and, 
secondarily, while playing volleyball she suffered a foot injury, which she alleged that 
the school declined to provide financial coverage for until a few years later. See id. at 
1121; Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (providing an 
additional exposition on the issue of application of the statute of limitations). 
168 The 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, supra note 49, tbl. 7, at 20, found 
male student-athletes received 57% ($1,411,400) of athletic scholarships, compared to 
43% ($1,055,500) awarded to female student-athletes, at Division I programs overall.  
169 See Snow, supra note 166, at 977. 
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III. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETIC EMPLOYMENT 
When sex discrimination occurs in the employment context, 
the question arises: Under what federal statutes can the relief be 
sought?  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter 
“Title VII”)170 prohibits sex discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of employment, and is applicable to most public and 
private employers, including educational employers.  The critical 
language of Title VII directs: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s . . . sex . . . .171 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (hereinafter “Equal Pay Act”),172 
which also covers educational employees, governs the issue of 
compensation.  The statute imposes equal pay “for equal work on 
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions . . . .”173  Whether educational employees may also 
pursue a claim of sex discrimination via Title IX is an issue which 
came to the forefront in the 1990s, and presently remains 
unresolved. 
A. Educational Employment Generally 
The pivotal question is whether any educational employee may 
assert a Title IX cause of action or whether they must pursue an 
 
170 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). See also Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A&M 
University System: Title IX Vis-à-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination in Educational 
Institutions, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998); Heckman, supra note 34, at 592–614. 
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See also, e.g., Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of the City of Hazel 
Park, 131 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (concluding an issue of fact existed in this 
Title VII action as to whether the failure to promote the current girls’ basketball coach, a 
female, as the boys’ basketball coach was based on sex discrimination). See generally 
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (deciding when punitive damages may 
be awarded in a Title VII action as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
172 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), (d)(1) (2000). 
173 Id. 
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action under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.  When 
allegations of sex discrimination by educational employees are 
raised, conflicting judicial decisions have yielded the following 
array of options: (a) there is no Title IX cause of action for sex 
discrimination; (b) there is a Title IX cause of action; (c) there is 
only a Title IX cause of action for employment claims of 
retaliation; (d) there is no Title IX cause of action for employment 
claims of retaliation; (e) Title VII standards will be applied when a 
Title IX cause of action is alleged; (f) Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VI”)174 standards will be applied; or 
(g) Title IX standards will be applied.  An anomalous situation has 
arisen where educational employees assert Title IX sex 
discrimination, depending on whether the individual is a regular 
employee or an athletic employee.  Courts have been more willing 
to find a Title IX cause of action brought by athletic department 
employees than in cases brought by non-athletic employees.  
Between 1995 and 1996, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuits all ruled on this issue involving non-athletic department 
employees, in, respectively: Lakoski v. James,175 Ivan v. Kent State 
 
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in certain 
public places, such as educational institutions). 
175 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995).  The Fifth Circuit rejected claim by the female medical 
professor, who was denied tenure, that Title IX provided a private cause of action for sex 
discrimination.  The Fifth Circuit stated: 
We are not persuaded that Congress intended that Title IX offer a bypass of the 
remedial process of Title VII.  We hold that Title VII provides the exclusive 
remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex 
in federally funded educational institutions.  We limit our holding to 
individuals seeking money damages under Title IX directly or derivatively 
through Section 1983 for employment practices for which Title VII provides a 
remedy, expressing no opinion whether Title VII excludes suits seeking only 
declaratory or injunctive relief. 
Id. at 753.  It amplified that: 
Given the availability of a private remedy under Title VII for aggrieved 
employees, we are unwilling to follow Dr. Lakoski’s beguilingly simple 
syllogism that Cannon, Bell, and Franklin all add up to an implied private right 
of action for damages under employment discrimination.  Doing so would 
disrupt a carefully balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment 
discrimination by employers such as the University of Texas Medical Branch. 
Id. at 754.  The appellate court cited the Department of Justice regulations for 
investigation of Title IX employment discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 42.604 (1994), and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] regulations, which adopt an 
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University,176 Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools,177 and Brine v. 
University of Iowa.178  Recent decisions have yielded mixed 
results.  In 1997, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holt v. 
Lewis179 and Brine v. University of Iowa.180 
Sandra Musso alleged that the defendant-university demoted 
her and then refused to renew her contract as Director of Sports 
Facilities because of her sex in Musso v. University of 
Minnesota.181  In 1980, the university entered into a consent decree 
that governed sex discrimination claims brought by female 
academic employees.182  The district court found the university’s 
actions were not the result of sex-based discrimination.183  The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed that result, but reversed the district court’s 
determination as to a retaliation claim, remanding this issue back 
to the district court with instructions to dismiss that claim.184 
The Sixth Circuit relied on Title VII to determine the unequal 
pay claim advanced via Title IX in Buntin v. Breathitt County 
Board of Education.185  In this case, the female former Director of 
Pupil Personnel alleged she was paid less than her male 
predecessor in violation of Title IX.  The court reversed a previous 
grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer since 
 
identical view of Title IX’s scope, 29 C.F.R. § 1691.4 (1994). Id. at 757. See also 
Heckman, supra note 170, at 755–58. 
176 No. 94-4090, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22269 (6th Cir. filed July 26, 1996) (affirming 
a grant of summary judgment for a university advisor and supervisor against a student’s 
gender discrimination claim of Title VII and Title IX violations based on her pregnancy 
and later childbirth). 
177 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a teacher who previously prevailed on a 
state employment discrimination claim was not precluded from seeking additional 
remedies against appellee school system under Title IX). 
178 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing the lower court’s judgment for plaintiff 
faculty members based on a failure to prove a causal connection between their allegations 
of sex discrimination and defendant university’s closing of its dental hygiene program). 
179 522 U.S. 817 (1997). 
180 519 U.S. 1149 (1997). 
181 105 F.3d 409 (8th Cir. 1997). 
182 Id. at 440. 
183 Id. at 441. 
184 Id. 
185 134 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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the plaintiff employee had met her prima facie burden of 
demonstrating employment discrimination.186 
In Carter v. Cornell University,187 a black female employed as 
a senior administrative secretary at Cornell University Medical 
Center alleged sex discrimination and racial discrimination due to 
poor evaluations she received.  On September 4, 1997, the New 
York district court ruled that it would apply Title VII standards to 
her Title IX claim.  “However, because plaintiff has raised Title IX 
claims dealing with sex discrimination and because Title IX adopts 
Title VII substantive standards . . . the court deals with both gender 
and race discrimination under Title VII.”188  The court also noted 
that “the Second Circuit has held that Title VII standards are to be 
applied in interpreting Title IX . . . .”189  Thus, the district court did 
“[n]ot reach the question of whether Title IX extends to employees 
involved in federally funded educational programs.”190  The 
following year, the same New York district court ruled, in Burrell 
v. City University of New York,191 that Title IX did not provide a 
university employee with a private right of action for sex 
 
186 Id. at 799. 
187 976 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, No. 97-CV-9180, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18807 (2d Cir. July 9, 1998). 
188 Id. at 229 n.2. 
189 Id. at 232, citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997), and Murray 
v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Weinstock v. 
Columbia Univ., No. 95-CV-569, 1999 WL 549006 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1999), aff’d, 224 
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000). 
190 Id. at 232. Compare Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to 
find a Title IX cause of action given the availability of Title VII for aggrieved 
employees), with Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, 821 F. Supp. 
166, 171–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a private right of action exists under Title IX 
for employees of federally funded educational programs). 
191 995 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Weinstock, 1999 WL 549006, at *1.  
The district court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment as to Title VII 
and Title IX causes of action by a female Ph.D. assistant professor in the chemistry 
department at Barnard College, a part of Columbia University.  She had alleged that she 
was denied tenure due to sex discrimination.  As to the Title IX claim, herein the court 
would apply the same standards as with the three-prong burden-shifting analysis used 
with Title VII cases. Id. at *7. See Gillen v. Borough of Manhattan Cmty. Coll., 1999 WL 
221105 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999), in a case brought by a female adjunct lecturer, who 
alleged Title IX sexual harassment, the same district court in this earlier opinion, stated, 
“[t]he provisions of Title IX have been construed to prohibit gender discrimination 
against students and employees in educational institutions that receive federal funding.” 
Id. at *2. 
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discrimination.  The Burrell court held that “the remedies of Title 
IX are limited to student plaintiffs, and Title VII is meant to offer 
the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination based on 
sex.”192 
In Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus College,193 a Minnesota 
district court found, “There is no private cause of action for 
damages available to a college employee under Title IX for sex 
discrimination.”194 
B. Hiring 
There continues be a scarcity of cases contesting hiring 
opportunities for female coaches or athletic positions in education, 
despite the paucity of women coaching men’s teams or being hired 
as athletic directors.  During Spring 2002, former professors R. 
Vivian Acosta and Linda Jean Carpenter issued an installment of 
their comprehensive study of women in intercollegiate sport 
involved with the NCAA.195  The study illustrated an overall 
downward trend for women in athletic employment positions.  It 
found the following: first, it showed that overall only 17.9% of 
head athletic directors of women’s programs are women.196  
Women hold the top athletic director positions of women’s 
programs at 8.4% of Division I, 16.1% of Division II, and 27.6% 
 
192 Burrell, 995 F. Supp. at 408. 
193 957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997). 
194 Id. at 193. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 760 n.48. 
195 See R. VIVIAN ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE 
SPORT: LONGITUDINAL STUDY—TWENTY-FIVE YEAR UPDATE: 1977–2002, at 2 (2002), 
available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF_ARTICLE/ 
pdf_file/906.pdf.  The actual number of women being head coaches of men’s teams at 
Division I schools is abominable some thirty years after Title IX’s passage.  The few 
women indicated as head coaches were in the sports of golf (one full-time) and track and 
field/cross country (five full-time). See 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, Supra 
note 49, tbl. 2A, at 13.  The few women indicated as assistant coaches were in the sports 
of soccer (one full-time), swimming/diving (one full-time), track and field/cross country 
(six full-time) and other sports (one full-time). See id., tbl. 2B, at 14.  This study does not 
provide the percentage statistics for the NCAA overall or a breakdown of the percentages 
for the respective divisions. See id.; infra note 204 (concerning the salaries accorded the 
coaches of the men’s versus women’s teams).   
196 ACOSTA & CARPENTER, supra note 195, at 16.  This represents a decrease from 
17.8% in 2000. Id.  In 1998, 19.4% of women’s programs were directed by females, an 
increase from 18.5% in 1996. Id. 
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of Division III schools.197  In 1998, only thirty women were the 
head athletic directors of Division I women’s athletic programs.198 
The study also found that only 44% of coaches of women’s 
teams of NCAA programs overall are females, down from 47.7% 
in 1996.199  This represents the lowest percentage compiled for that 
statistic.  The 2002 figures disclosed that women comprise head 
coaches as follows: 45.1% at the Division I level, 38.9% at 
Division II, and 45.6% at Division III.200  Conversely, the 
“percentage of females among the coaching ranks of men’s 
athletics remains under 2% as it has been for at least the last three 
decades,”201 while  55.5% of all assistant coaching positions of 
women’s teams are female.202  Further, only 12.3% have women 
serving as the full-time sports information directors and 27.8% of 
head athletic trainers are women.203 
C. Equal Pay 
During 1998, a Chronicle of Higher Education survey found, 
“At the median institution for men’s [NCAA intercollegiate] head 
coaches, their average salary was $54,800.  At the median 
institution for women’s head coaches, their average salary was 
$39,400.  However, men’s coaches made 43% more than women’s 
coaches at the median institution.”204  The 2001 Knight 
 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 17. 
199 Id. at 10. 
200 Id. at 9.  The overall figure shows a decline from women comprising 48.3% in 1992, 
52.4% in 1982 and more than 90% in 1972 (when it was customary to have the same-sex 
coach for the sports teams). Id. at 10. 
201 Id. at 2. 
202 Id. at 14.  This demonstrates another decrease from 2000 figures: 59.8% of all 
assistant coaching positions of women’s teams are female; with 62% at Division I, 54.5% 
at Division II, and 59.3% at Division III. Id. 
203 Id. at 18. 
204 Jim Naughton, Salaries of Head Coaches Are Rising, Survey Shows: Men and 
Women are Both Gaining, but a Gender Gap Persists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 
1998, at A55.  Coaches of women’s teams are still lagging behind in salaries.  At 
Division I, the average institutional expense for salaries for coaches of men’s teams was 
$484,900 (59%), while the average institutional expense for salaries for coaches of 
women’s teams was $330,500 (41%).  1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, supra 
note 49, tbl. 7, at 20.  For assistant coaches, the average institutional expense for salaries 
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Commission Report cautioned against the escalation in athletics 
costs and stated, “A glaring symptom of the arms race run amok is 
the salaries of the so-called ‘star’ coaches.  At last count, some 30 
[men’s] college football and men’s basketball coaches are paid a 
million dollars or more a year.  A few are nearing twice that, or are 
already there.”205  Coaches of female teams are uniformly absent 
from that extremely well-paid pantheon.  The issue of equal pay 
will be more roundly discussed in the cases involving termination 
of athletic positions.  There was no case law during this period 
involving female athletic employees who, while employed, alleged 
Title IX violations on the issue of unequal pay compared to male 
athletic employees. 
D. Termination 
One of the most contested issues in Title IX jurisprudence 
today is whether female coaches, female athletic employees or 
coaches of female teams have been discriminated against when 
they are terminated or not promoted.206  These cases routinely 
include allegations of retaliation.207 
 
for coaches of men’s teams was $580,100 (72%), while the average institutional expense 
for salaries for assistant coaches of women’s teams was $231,000 (28%). Id. tbl. 7, at 20. 
 At Division I overall, the highest paid head coaches are the football coaches with an 
average salary of $177,200.  The average salary for coaches of men’s basketball teams 
compared to coaches of women’s basketball teams is $149,700 to $91,300.  Coaches of 
men’s baseball teams receive an average salary of $55,400 compared to coaches of 
women’s softball teams with an average salary of $38,900.  There is a startling 
discrepancy in salary for the sport of ice hockey, where coaches of the men’s teams 
average $94,000 compared to only $43,600 for coaches of women’s teams.  There is 
almost parity in soccer, where the coaches of the men’s team average $42,500 compared 
to $40,300 for the coaches of the women’s teams. Id. tbl. 5A, at 17. 
 The figures become more glaring when examining the high-profile Division I-A 
universities and colleges, where the average compensation for football coaches is 
$267,000.  The next highest-paid coaches are the coaches of the men’s basketball teams 
with average salaries of $216,400, compared to only $130,600 for coaches of women’s 
teams.  The average institutional salary for coaches of the baseball teams is $77,500 
compared to $53,500 for softball teams.  Parity is represented in soccer with $49,200 for 
the men’s teams compared to $49,900 for the women’s teams. Id. tbl. 5A, at 29. 
205 Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 147, at 18. 
206 See Heckman, supra note 25, at 421–22 n.143 (listing the numerous lawsuits 
commenced). 
207 See infra Part III.E. 
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1. Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System 
In Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System,208 a female 
athletic employee alleged retaliation and sex discrimination under 
Title IX and state laws because she was not named athletic director 
and was demoted from the women’s athletic coordinator position 
at Tarleton University, which is part of the Texas A&M University 
System.209  The district court dismissed the complaint in its 
entirety.210  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court found that there was 
no Title IX private discrimination cause of action for a female 
coach at a post-secondary institution211 but allowed the claim for 
retaliation.212 
On remand, the district court denied in part and granted in part 
defendants’ amended motion for summary judgment.213  First, the 
court denied the defendants’ motion as to the Equal Pay Act and 
Title VII claims of discrimination in pay.214  The court stressed that 
discriminatory intent is not required for a prima facie case under 
the Equal Pay Act, unlike for Title VII.215  Secondly, the court held 
that although Lowrey could compare her salary to that of the male 
men’s athletics coordinator she could not compare her pay to the 
female women’s athletic coordinator.  “The Equal Pay Act only 
prohibits pay differences between members of the opposite sex,”216 
the court instructed.  However, the court denied summary 
judgment since an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff 
received adequate, equal pay for her work as the Athletics 
Coordinator.217  The court found: 
The evidence . . . shows that Johnson [(the men’s athletics 
coordinator)], who held a quasi-administrative position, 
received $9,062 from the Athletics Administration Budget, 
 
208 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997). 
209 Id. at 244. 
210 Id. at 245. 
211 Id. at 251. 
212 Id. at 252. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 760–62 (analyzing the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling). 
213 Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 11 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
214 Id. at 909. 
215 Id. at 906. 
216 Id. at 907. 
217 See id. at 908. 
5 - HECKMAN FORMAT 4/15/03  9:51 AM 
2003] TITLE IX AT THIRTY 597 
while Lowrey, who held a similar quasi-administrative 
position, received nothing from the Athletics 
Administration Budget.  Moreover, Johnson’s overall 
salary increased by $5,430 after he assumed the positions 
of Men’s Athletics Coordinator and NCAA Compliance 
Coordinator while Lowrey’s salary did not rise at all when 
she assumed the official position of Women’s Athletics 
Coordinator.218 
The court added, “None of Lowrey’s salary came out of the 
Athletics Administration Budget; it all came out of the women’s 
basketball and physical education budgets.”219 
Next, the court analyzed the plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX 
claims separately.  Under Title VII, the retaliatory action must 
affect the ultimate employment decision concerning five actions: 
hiring, granting leave, discharge, promotion, or compensation.220  
“Demotion is the opposite of promotion [thus] . . . Lowrey’s 
removal from the position [as Women’s Athletics Coordinator] 
was an adverse employment action.”221  The court, therefore, 
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claim.  
Concerning Title IX, the court stated, “While the Lowrey I court 
held that Title IX implies a retaliation claim, the court did not 
address what substantive legal standards apply to such a claim.”222  
The court found that the Title IX retaliation claim “is best analyzed 
under the standard Burdine-McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
scheme for employment discrimination claims.”223  Thus, the court 
would apply a modified Title VII approach to the Title IX 
retaliation claim.224  In critical language, the court stated, “Because 
a Title IX retaliation claim only covers conduct protected by Title 
IX, a plaintiff may only recover under Title IX when the defendant 
retaliated against her ‘solely as a consequence of complaints 
 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 909. 
220 See id. at 910. 
221 Id. at 907. 
222 Id. at 911. 
223 Id. But see 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2002) (“[T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are 
hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference.”). 
224 See Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Naughton, supra note 204. 
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alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of Title 
IX.’”225  Moreover, “[r]etaliation claims brought under Title IX 
protect against a broad array of retaliatory conduct unrelated to 
employment.”226  Thus, the court set out the elements for 
establishing such a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title IX: 
(1) the plaintiff engaged in activities protected by Title IX; (2) the 
university-employer took adverse action against the plaintiff; and  
(3) a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s protected 
activities and the university-employer’s adverse action.227 
Addressing the second element of its test, the district court 
ruled that such adverse actions are not limited to “ultimate 
employment decisions,”228 (referenced with Title VII claims) 
rather the law “protects against a broader range of retaliatory 
conduct.”229  Addressing the third element, the court found that the 
plaintiff failed to establish a “causal connection between her 
protected Title IX conduct and Tarleton’s failure to promote her to 
Athletics Director.”230  However, the plaintiff did establish a prima 
facie case as to her demotion.231  Thus, the court granted the 
defendant summary judgment as to the Title IX retaliation claim 
which dealt with the lack of a promotion, but denied summary 
judgment on the Title IX retaliation claim which dealt with her 
demotion.232 
 
225 Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911. Contra Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 
F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).  There was no private cause of action for Title IX retaliation 
for a terminated male former girls’ basketball coach, who allegedly complained of gender 
inequities concerning his athletes.  The Eleventh Circuit stated, “But the Court has not 
overturned the specific holding of Cannon, and so a direct victim of gender 
discrimination still may pursue a private right of action under Title IX to remedy the 
discrimination she has suffered.” Id. at 1343. 
226 Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (emphasis added). 
227 See id. 
228 Id. at 910. 
229 Id. at 912. 
230 Id. at 914. 
231 Id. 
232 See id. 
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2. Stanley v. University of Southern California 
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit, in Stanley v. University of Southern 
California,233 affirmed the district court’s denial of Marianne 
Stanley’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking 
reinstatement to her position as the women’s basketball coach.  
Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
university on all causes of action.234  Stanley again appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.  Some additional pleadings were filed due to the 
implementation of new Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) guidelines.235  On June 2, 1999, the Ninth 
Circuit finally rendered its 2-1 decision.236 
First, as to the Equal Pay Act, the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the jobs being 
compared are “substantially equal.”237  Despite the parties’ 
differing opinions as to whether the job as head basketball coach 
for the men’s and women’s teams were substantially equal, the 
appellate court found that the university could pay a different 
salary to the men’s head basketball coach due the “markedly 
disparate levels of experience and qualifications” between the two 
individuals.238  The court took explicit notice that the women’s 
basketball coach had fourteen years less coaching experience, had 
never coached an Olympic team or authored a book on basketball, 
and had no marketing or promotional experience other than that 
gained as a coach.239  Thus, the court determined that the 
university satisfied one of the affirmative defenses attributable to 
an Equal Pay claim, basing the salary on factors other than sex: 
 
233 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994). 
234 Stanley v. Univ. S. Cal., No. 93-CV-4708, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5026 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 8, 1995), aff’d, 178 F.3d. 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). 
235 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604–1607. See 
also Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the EEOC guidelines for 
the first time in a Title IX case). 
236 178 F.3d 1069. 
237 Id. at 1074. 
238 Id. at 1075. 
239 Id. at 1075–76 (citing Harker v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 85 F. Supp. 378 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[N]ine year experience differential between women’s and men’s 
basketball coaches justifies pay differential . . . .”), but failing to recognize that Stanley 
had led her former team to three championships, while the men’s basketball coach had 
not). 
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“Stanley has conspicuously failed, moreover, to present any 
meaningful evidence in support of her claim that she and [the 
men’s basketball coach] had comparable levels of experience.”240 
Dismissing the Title IX cause of action, the court rule that 
because “Stanley fails to show any discriminatory conduct on the 
part of the defendants, all of these claims fail as well.”241  
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of the Fifth 
Circuit decision in Lowrey, and did not, on its own volition, find 
that there is no cause of action for employees asserting Title IX 
violations against educational employers.  The court also found no 
claim of retaliation, although that assertion was not brought 
pursuant to Title IX.242  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded 
only as to whether the district court had abused its discretion in 
awarding costs to the university in the amount of approximately 
$47,000.243 
Judge Pregerson’s dissent noted: 
By focusing on the differences between Stanley’s and 
Raveling’s qualifications, the majority skips over the many 
ways in which gender discrimination insidiously affected 
the University’s treatment of the women’s basketball 
program and Stanley as its Head Coach.  The University’s 
half-hearted promotion of the women’s basketball program, 
its intensive marketing of the men’s basketball program, 
and the formidable obstacles Stanley faced as a woman 
athlete in a male-dominated profession contributed to this 
disparate treatment.244 
The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari in this case.245 
 
240 Id. at 1076. 
241 Id. at 1077. 
242 See id. 
243 See id. at 1079–80. 
244 Id. at 1080 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
245 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 528 U.S. 1022 (1999).  Stanley went on to coach in the 
Women’s National Basketball Association, where she was named head coach of the 
Washington Mystics. See Mystics Name Coach (No, Not Him), NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 5, 
2002, at A74. 
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3. Perdue v. City University of New York 
During August 1997, the district court judge in Perdue v. City 
University of New York,246 following the Fifth Circuit decision in 
Lowrey, rejected the Title IX employment cause of action brought 
by Molly Perdue,247 the former women’s basketball coach and 
women’s sports administrator at Brooklyn College (a part of the 
City University of New York (CUNY)), but allowed her claim for 
Title IX retaliation to go to the jury.248  The jury found none in the 
multi-based cause of action lawsuit. 
The following year, the same New York district court ruled on 
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims, as well as Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.249  First, in addressing the Equal Pay Act, 
the district court ruled that: 
To show a violation of the EPA, a plaintiff need not prove 
that an intention to discriminate on the basis of gender 
motivated the pay disparity. 
 Where there is a willful violation of the EPA, the 
resulting compensatory award should be doubled as 
liquidated damages.  A violation of the EPA is willful if 
“the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for 
the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the 
statute.”250 
 
246 No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997). 
247 Transcript of Trial Before the Honorable Frederic Block, United States District 
Judge, and a Jury, Perdue v. City of New York (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997) (No. 93-CV-
5939).  Judge Block opined: 
I agree with Lakoski [v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995),] completely insofar 
as these basic intentional discrimination and hostile work environment cases 
are brought forth, that they are really Title VII claims, and that Title IX should 
not give plaintiffs a way of obviating the total remedy and the totality of what 
Congress has divined in Title VII by characterizing the same claims, 
substantively, as Title IX claims. 
Id. at 6, ll. 2–9. 
248 Id. 
249 Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
250 Id. at 332–33 (citations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Waldbaum, 52 F.3d 35, 39 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
5 - HECKMAN FORMAT 4/15/03  9:51 AM 
602 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 551 
According to the job descriptions, both the men’s and women’s 
sports administrators had the same eleven duties, but Perdue had 
an extra duty of being available for guidance of all female student-
athletes.251  Perdue reported her inferior working conditions to her 
superiors, including that she was doing laundry for the women’s 
basketball team, and the conflicting practice times for the men’s 
and women’s teams.252  In an interesting aside, the district court 
noted that “despite the fact that the Office [for] Civil Rights found 
that CUNY [at Brooklyn College] had committed multiple Title IX 
violations, there was testimony that CUNY did not implement the 
modifications promised in its detailed assurances.” 253  The court 
therefore concluded that the College’s actions were willful.254 
On June 19, 1998, the trial court judge issued judgment for 
$799,566.73 in favor of the plaintiff.255  The court found damages 
of $134,829 in back wages, $85,000 in compensatory damages, 
$5,262 in unpaid retirement benefits, and $134,829 in liquidated 
damages.256  An appeal and a cross-appeal were filed for 
determination by the Second Circuit.257  The parties reached a 
confidential settlement in April 1999, that the court approved.258 
 
251 See id. at 334. 
252 Id. at 335. 
253 Id. 
254 See id. 
255 Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. judgment entered June 19, 
1998). 
256 Id. 
257 Id.  The parties had been awaiting resolution by the Second Circuit of the appeal in 
Anderson v. State University of New York, College at New Paltz, 169 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 
1999), vacated by 528 U.S. 1111 (2000).  On remand from the Supreme Court, the 
Northern District Court of New York ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit 
use of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), in a case brought by a tenured 
female professor. Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 107 F. Supp. 2d 158 (N.D.N.Y. 
2000).  The professor alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act due to a branch of the New 
York State University not paying her equally to her male counterparts.  The court held 
that the Equal Pay Act was enacted pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 162–63. The parties in the Perdue case had been 
contemplating whether they would stay pursuit of their Second Circuit appeal pending the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari decision in the Anderson case. 
258 Perdue, No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. settlement entered June 22, 1999). 
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4. Weaver v. Ohio State University 
In Weaver v. Ohio State University,259 Karen Weaver, a former 
women’s field hockey coach, commenced a lawsuit on November 
21, 1996, alleging that her termination was predicated on sex 
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX, Title VII, the 
Equal Pay Act, and state law.  On June 4, 1997, the Ohio district 
court partially granted and partially denied the defendant-
university’s motion to dismiss.  Weaver complained to the 
university about the poor condition of the artificial grass practice 
field used for field hockey and talked with the NCAA Peer Review 
Committee representatives, who visited the campus, in conjunction 
with the NCAA program requiring certification about this same 
issue.  Weaver compared her treatment to the men’s ice hockey 
coach’s (as there was no men’s field hockey team offered at OSU), 
who received a higher salary than she did.  The plaintiff asserted 
she was treated 
[D]ifferently than male coaches, specifically Randy Ayers, 
then coach of the OSU men’s basketball team, who was allegedly 
afforded greater tolerance for his team members’ disciplinary 
problems.  Plaintiff also contends that she was not offered another 
position within the OSU Athletic Department upon her 
termination, unlike Jerry Welsh, the men’s hockey coach.260 
The district court, in a 29-page decision, granted the defendant-
university motion for summary judgment on all counts.261  The 
court initially went over the grounds for the granting of summary 
judgment before addressing the substantive claims. 
As to the claim of discriminatory discharge pursuant to Title 
VII and Title IX, the court found: 
[The plaintiff] had produced no direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive on the part of the defendants, nor has 
 
259 71 F. Supp. 2d 789 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1315 (6th Cir. 1999).  This 
appears to be the first Title IX lawsuit commenced by a women’s field hockey coach. See 
also Rallins v. Ohio State Univ., 191 F. Supp. 2d 920 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (dismissing a 
female women’s head track and field coach’s Title VII, Equal Pay Act, and Title IX 
causes of action predicated on sex discrimination). 
260 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
261 Id. at 789. 
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she met her burden of producing evidence sufficient to 
satisfy all of the elements of a prima facie case of 
discriminatory discharge in light of the fact that the person 
who was hired to replace her is also a woman.262 
Regarding Title IX, the court noted, “The Title VII standards 
for proving discriminatory treatment also apply to claims of 
employment discrimination brought under Title IX.”263  In 
addition, this court would apply the Title VII standards for 
retaliation in the Title IX action.264  The court stated: 
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation the plaintiff must 
show: 1) that she engaged in protected opposition to Title 
VII or Title IX discrimination or participated in a Title VII 
or Title IX proceeding; 2) that plaintiff’s exercise of her 
protected rights was known to the defendants; 3) that she 
was subjected to an adverse employment action subsequent 
to or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and 4) 
that there was a causal connection between the protected 
activity and the adverse employment action.265 
In examining the Title IX retaliation claim, the court ruled that 
the complaints about the condition of the hockey practice field 
were not couched in terms of Title IX sex discrimination.  
“Complaints concerning unfair treatment in general which do not 
specifically address discrimination are insufficient to constitute 
protected activity.”266  Moreover, “[d]efendants also note that the 
Title IX complaint would have been unfounded in light of the fact 
that the men’s lacrosse team also used the same practice field.” 267  
The university also presented evidence that they never had 
 
262 Id. at 793. 
263 Id. (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, Tennessee, 103 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. 
of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
264 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 793. See also Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 
242 (5th Cir. 1997). 
265 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (citing Cantia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 
1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
266 Id. at 793–94. 
267 Id. at 794 (“The turf was replaced in the summer of 1996 when funds became 
available.”). 
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knowledge of the plaintiff’s comments to the NCAA Peer Review 
Committee, which were confidential.  Based on all of these factors, 
there were no grounds for the retaliation claim.268  Weaver was 
dismissed a short time after her interview with the NCAA 
members.  Nonetheless, the court stated, “[T]emporal proximity 
between the complaints and the employment action alone is 
usually not sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory 
discrimination in the absence of other evidence.”269  The male 
athletic director testified that he had made his decision to terminate 
the field hockey coach prior to her meeting with the NCAA 
representatives.270  The court also accepted the defendants’ reason 
for terminating the coach, which was based on concerns players 
voiced about her style of coaching.271  This provided a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination.272  The judge 
elaborated, “The defendants’ reason for terminating plaintiff’s 
employment need not be a good reason, but rather only a non-
discriminatory reason.”273  Although the plaintiff contended that 
her strong stance on the university anti-drug and alcohol policy 
was a factor in the discharge,274 the court ruled that she lacked 
standing.275 
As to the Equal Pay Act, the court emphasized, “A plaintiff’s 
comparison to a specifically chosen employee should be 
scrutinized closely to determine its usefulness.  Courts which have 
addressed the merits of Equal Pay Act claims advanced by coaches 
of athletic teams have been reluctant to find an equality of work 
between coaches of different sports.”276  The decision went on to 
 
268 Id. at 793. 
269 Id. at 794. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 795–96. 
272 Id. at 796. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 796–97. 
275 See Heckman, supra note 10, at 865 n.129. 
276 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 799–800 (citations omitted) (citing EEOC v. Madison 
Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting findings of 
equality between boy’s soccer and girls’ volleyball and basketball teams and between 
boy’s track and girl’s basketball teams); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 
(D. Minn. 1994) (finding women’s gymnastic coach not substantially equal to men’s 
football, hockey, and basketball coaches)). 
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summarize the relevant elements for an Equal Pay Act claim, 
pronouncing: 
In determining whether men’s and women’s coaching 
positions are equal, courts have looked to such factors as 
team size, the number of assistant coaches, recruiting 
responsibilities, the amount of spectator attendance and 
community interest in the sport, the amount of revenue 
generated by the sport, the degree of responsibility in the 
area of public and media relations and promotional 
activities, and the relative importance of the sport in the 
athletic program as a whole.277 
The court found that the field hockey season spanned only 
about two months, featuring nineteen to twenty-one games, 
whereas ice hockey extended over five months, with larger squads 
playing thirty-five to thirty-eight games.278  Once again, as in 
Stanley,279 the men’s ice hockey coach had “a greater burden in the 
public relations area.”280  Also, the men’s team produced 
substantially more revenue than the field hockey team.281  The 
university also articulated a market condition defense for paying 
the men’s ice hockey coach more: since there was professional ice 
hockey and there was no equivalent for field hockey, the best ice 
hockey college coaches would be more actively recruited by other 
schools.282  No statistics were provided for this statement.  
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s salary was above the salary for the 
average field hockey coach in the Big Ten Conference, of which 
OSU was a member, as well as the NCAA average.283 
In a first judicial reference to the new 1997 EEOC Guidelines 
in the area of educational athletics programs and Title VII and the 
 
277 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 
1321–23 (9th Cir. 1994); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C., 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1323–26 
(W.D.N.C. 1995), aff’d, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Deli, 863 F. Supp. at 961; Jacobs v. 
Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff’d, 661 F.2d 922 
(4th Cir. 1981)). 
278 Id. 
279 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994). 
280 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 See id. at 802. 
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Equal Pay Act, the court dismissed them out-of-hand stating, 
“While plaintiff cites non-binding Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines published in October of 1997 which call 
for a comparable worth analysis, such guidelines do not have the 
effect of agency regulations and are not entitled to deference.”284  
The court concluded: 
Only the men’s football coach and the men’s and women’s 
basketball coaches are given multi-year contracts.  There is 
no evidence that the job of women’s field hockey is 
substantially identical to any of these multi-year positions, 
and a substantial number of male coaches of comparable 
minor sports teams are impacted equally with female 
coaches by this policy.285 
The Sixth Circuit summarily affirmed the decision.286 
5. Other Pending Cases 
In Bedard v. Roger Williams University,287 the former female 
associate athletic director unsuccessfully brought suit against a 
Division III university for failing to be promoted to the position of 
athletic director.  The court found that the university’s actions did 
not constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title IX where the 
university hired a male applicant to fill the position. 
In October, 1998, the Illinois district court, in Harper v. Illinois 
State University,288  granted in part and denied in part the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment concerning the coach of 
a women’s basketball team, who alleged sex discrimination.  In 
Legoff v. Trustees of Boston University,289 the district court 
 
284 Id. See also EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11 (2002). 
285 Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 802. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 764–66 
(discussing the EEOC Guidelines). 
286 Weaver v. Ohio State Univ., 194 F.3d 1315 (6th Cir. 1999). 
287 989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997). See also generally McKenzie v. Wright State Univ., 
683 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that a former assistant women’s basketball 
coach did not establish her claim of sex discrimination and noting that the coach 
advanced no Title IX claim). 
288 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Ill. 1999). 
289 23 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 1998). 
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examined whether a former women’s basketball coach at Boston 
University had satisfied the statute of limitations for commencing 
her lawsuit.  In Deli v. University of Minnesota,290 a former 
women’s gymnastics coach, who had previously sought damages 
pursuant to Title IX,291 could not recover for emotional distress 
damages.292  In this state court action, the plaintiff asserted 
violation of promissory estoppel based on the athletic director’s 
alleged breach of an oral promise not to view a videotape that 
contained both the gymnastics team’s performance and the coach’s 
sexual encounter with her husband, an assistant coach of the team, 
who was also terminated.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
overturned the state judge’s award of $675,000 in damages.293 
The first Title IX decision concerning a referee was rendered in 
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n,294 where 
Noreen Kemether, a female basketball referee, alleged sex 
discrimination against the Pennsylvania Interscholastic High 
School Athletic Association (PIAA) for assigning her a work 
schedule which excluded boys’ high school basketball games.295  
The Pennsylvania district court, in addressing motions for 
summary judgment submitted by both sides, initially found that the 
athletic association was not the referee’s employer for purposes of 
Title VII employment discrimination;296 however, an issue of fact 
remained as to whether the athletic association was an employment 
agency so as to trigger Title VII.297  As to the Title IX claim, the 
 
290 No. C9-97-1530 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 1998). 
291 Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994) (granting defendant-
university’s motion for summary judgment). See also Gabor Deli v. Univ. of Minn., No. 
93-CV-0501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (granting defendant-university’s motion for 
summary judgment concerning the lawsuit alleging violation of a number of grounds, 
including Title IX, based on the university’s termination of the male former assistant 
women’s gymnastics coach). 
292  Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). See also Deli v. 
Univ. of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming termination of the 
coaches despite lack of strict adherence to procedural due process set forth in the 
university manual). 
293 Deli, 578 N.W.2d at 784. 
294 15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
295 Id. at 743–44. 
296  Id. at 758 (concerning the regular season). See also id. at 761 (addressing the post-
season arrangement). 
297  Id. at 764. 
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court ruled that an issue of fact remained;298 secondarily, Title IX 
subsumed the section 1983 cause of action alleged because of the 
Equal Protection Clause.299  After the trial, the jury awarded 
Kemether $314,000 in compensatory damages against the state 
athletic association.300  The jury found that the PIAA’s refusal to 
evaluate women was “a necessary step toward being assigned to 
[referee] regular season boys’ junior and varsity high school 
games.”301  The association sought to have the award thrown out.  
On further review, the Pennsylvania district court denied the 
association’s request for a new trial and for a judgment in its favor 
as a matter of law.302 
6. Cases settled 
A number of cases, all involving intercollegiate coaches who 
were terminated, were settled from 1997 to 2000,303 including 
Carver v. St. Leo’s College,304 where the head coach and assistant 
coach—both males—of the successful women’s softball 
intercollegiate team at the college brought a lawsuit regarding their 
suspension.  On March 27, 1997, the district court held one need 
not be a student to advance a Title IX claim for retaliation.305 
In 1997, the parties in Hawkins v. Loyola University306 settled 
the case brought by a male women’s basketball coach who was 
terminated, alleging sexual discrimination.  That summer, the 
parties in Gobrecht v. Reed307 settled a case brought by a former 
women’s basketball coach at Florida State University.  Later that 
 
298  Id. at 766 (finding that the athletic association would be within Title IX’s scope).  
299  Id. at 767 (restricting this ruling only to the Fourteenth Amendment claim and not 
the First Amendment claim advanced by the plaintiff). 
300 Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, No. 96-CV-6986, 1999 WL 1012957, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1999). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
303 See, e.g., Plotzke v. Boston Coll., No. 94-CV-12329 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 1995) 
(involving the termination of a female women’s basketball coach at the university). See 
also Heckman, supra note 25, at 421 n.142. 
304 No. 96-383-CIV-T-25C (M.D. Fla. 1996). See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 764 
(discussing Carver). 
305 Carver, No. 96-383-CIV-T-25C. 
306 No. 94-L03300 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1997). 
307 No. 497-CV-237 (N.D. Fla. 1997). 
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year, in Dugan v. State of Oregon,308 the parties settled the case, 
reportedly for $1.09 million, after the jury issued a million-dollar 
plus verdict in favor of the former female women’s softball coach 
at Oregon State University.309  In November, 1998, the parties 
settled in Masten v. Truman State University,310 involving a female 
former women’s volleyball coach.  This settlement is noteworthy 
as the university, in addition to reaching a monetary settlement 
with the coach, agreed to ensure equitable conditions for its female 
student-athletes.  In another instance, Perdue University and Lin 
Dunn, a female former women’s basketball coach, reached an 
agreement prior to any lawsuit.311 
E. Retaliation 
Title IX prohibits retaliation312 by educational institutions 
against individuals who claim a violation of statutorily prescribed 
gender equity.  Claims predicated on the retaliation portion of Title 
IX were neglected until recently.313  In a number of recent cases, 
coaches who were terminated also raised claims of unlawful 
retaliation.314 
 
308 No. 95-CV-6250 (D. Or. 1997). 
309 Id. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 762–63 (“However, the Court granted the 
institution’s motion for a remittitur, in part, reducing the [total] jury award of $1.28 
million to approximately $724,000, including $285,000 against the individual defendant, 
plus post-judgment interest.”); Sarah Nathanson, Title IX Report Card, WOMEN’S SPORTS 
EXPERIENCE, May/June 1999, at 13; Brian A. Snow, Broadening the Demand for Gender-
Equity in Athletics: Financial Aid & Coaches’ Compensation, 130 EDUC. L. REP. 965, 
985 (1997). 
310 1998 WL 2570894 (D. Mo. 1998).  Truman State University (Missouri) agreed to 
pay former women’s volleyball coach, Deborah Masten, $175,000 and to provide equal 
treatment for women athletes. Id. See also Karen Dillon, Truman to Provide Gender 
Equity, Give Ex-Coach $175,000, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 6, 1998, at D1. 
311 See Barbara Baker, It’s A Dunn Deal, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 28, 1999, at C7. 
312 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (2002). 
313 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Regents, No. 94-CV-0289 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Jan. 30, 1995) 
(regarding sex discrimination claim brought by Stephanie Schleuder, the women’s 
volleyball coach of the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities, who had been an ardent 
supporter of pay equity).  The case was settled during April 1995. Schleuder had 
previously voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit after her request for a temporary 
restraining order was denied. See Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA REG., Apr. 26, 
1995, at 1, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1995/19950426.pdf. 
314 See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Gobrecht v. Reed, No. 497-CV-0237 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 
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F. Reverse Discrimination 
In a move toward gender parity between men’s and women’s 
coaches, one university reduced the salary of the men’s basketball 
coach to that received by the women’s basketball coach, rather 
than raising the salary of the women’s coach to match the salary of 
the men’s team.  The male coach in Reinhart v. Georgia State 
University,315 brought suit alleging reverse sex discrimination.  The 
complaint raised no Title IX claim.  On July 1, 1997, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of the university’s 
motion for summary judgment.316 
CONCLUSION 
Remarkable progress has been made by women in the 
twentieth century due to increased educational opportunities.  As 
the nation celebrates Title IX’s thirtieth anniversary, however, 
continued progress needs to be made in this area to ensure the 
promise of equal opportunity for the students and employees of 
educational institutions. 
The courts and litigants continue to explore the parameters of 
Title IX, while Congress, for the most part, has exhibited a hands-
off policy.  On the legislative front, Congress should clarify 
whether Title IX was meant to preempt section 1983 actions.317  
Congress should impose a national statute of limitations to govern 
private lawsuits.  Congress should consider eliminating the contact 
sports element found in the Title IX regulations, which continues 
to insulate men’s teams to the detriment of capable and interested 
female student-athletes (recognizing that the reverse could 
seriously erode “female” or “coed” teams).  One solution is to 
adopt a standard such as the state of New York allows for its 
 
No. 95-CV-4334 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1995), aff’d, 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997); Clay v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Neosho Cmty. Coll., 905 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Kan. 1995); Perdue v. City 
Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Carter v. Cornell Univ., 976 F. Supp. 
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
315 No. 95-CV-0204 (N.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d without op., 119 F.3d 11 (11th Cir. 1997). 
316 Reinhart, 119 F.3d at 11. 
317  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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interscholastic athletes in grades seven through twelve, identified 
herein. 
The Department of Education’s formation of a Title IX 
commission to investigate the application of the law to 
intercollegiate athletic departments could have profound effects in 
seriously eroding the precarious advancements that have been 
achieved  in the last thirty years, including possibly eviscerating 
the effective accommodation test and effectively negating the 
strong consensus exhibited by the circuit courts. 
The Supreme Court dove into the Title IX waters by agreeing 
to hear three appeals in recent years.  In Smith, the Court ruled on 
whether the NCAA, the pre-eminent collegiate athletic association, 
was a recipient of federal funds due to its receipt of funds from 
member post-secondary institutions that had received federal 
funds, to engender jurisdiction.  The Court concluded the NCAA 
was not bound by Title IX based on the facts presented.  The 
Supreme Court in Gebser imposed a tough standard for 
establishing liability by students against educational institutions for 
teacher-student sexual harassment.  The Court followed this in 
Davis, imposing a strict standard for those claiming peer sexual 
harassment against educational institutions. 
An unanswered question that has emerged is whether the 
Gebser decision requires all individuals to place the offending 
educational institutions on notice in Title IX cases, even when not 
pursuing a sexual harassment claim.  Queries also arise as to 
specifically who would be required to be informed and what serves 
as sufficient notice.  This uncertainty could significantly foreclose 
student-athletes from seeking redress in cross-over or equal 
opportunity cases.  An educational institution may be unaware of 
the intentional harassing actions by an employee, as was at issue in 
Gebser.  However, the issue becomes troublesome with claims 
involving lack of gender equity in athletics departments, where 
elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools are clearly 
aware of how many students are participating in athletic 
departments, the history of their athletic departments as well as the 
allocation of scholarships, supplies, equipment, the number of 
coaches and tutors, and other provisions offered when separate 
athletic departments are provided.  Will educational institutions be 
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shielded from possible Title IX liability because the student or 
prospective student-athlete did not inform the proper authority of 
the failure to provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports or 
benefits accorded or athletic scholarship money provided? 
Physical education classes: Despite the passage of thirty 
years, there has been no case law involving the conduct of physical 
education classes. 
Cross-over cases: In the area of athletics, cross-over litigation 
has slowed down involving interscholastic athletics.  Remarkably, 
the Mercer case is the only decision involving an individual of one 
sex seeking to participate on the team composed of members of the 
other sex on the intercollegiate level.  While this NCAA Division I 
team at Duke University was deemed a coed team no females had 
ever been a formal part of the team, and Mercer would complete 
her undergraduate degree without being included on the official 
roster.  While the Fourth Circuit recently rejected allowing 
punitive damages against the private university, the jury verdict 
awarding $2 million in punitive damages nevertheless sent a strong 
message. 
Female athletes and the selection of sports: The last decade 
has been engulfed with the issue of whether the first program area 
involving the selection of sports when separate athletic programs 
are provided for males and females, as required by the equal 
opportunity subsection, has been met, played out exclusively on 
the intercollegiate level.  Seven Circuit Courts (First, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) have all approved use of 
the effective accommodation test to ascertain whether the first 
program area has been satisfied.  Until 2001, female collegiate 
students were successful on the federal circuit court level in every 
Title IX lawsuit commenced alleging the lack of equal opportunity 
in the provision of athletic opportunities.  The Eighth Circuit 
decision in Grandson broke that record, and should be monitored 
to determine whether the strict Gebser notice standard will be 
imposed on non-sexual harassment Title IX matters in other 
jurisdictions. A Newsday editorial summarized the resultant 
benefits of the Title IX statute, stating: 
It was a proud day for soccer moms—and their daughters 
too.  But the U.S. women’s soccer team’s recent World 
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Cup win over China was one more victory, too, for Title 
IX, which bought equal access to sports for girls.  The 
women’s soccer team, the Olympic gold medal-winning 
U.S. women’s hockey team and the ongoing, televised and 
popular Women’s National Basketball Association teams 
would not have been possible without the still-controversial 
1972 change in federal law.  Title IX has paved the way for 
girls to go into good sports programs by barring sex 
discrimination in federally funded education programs.  As 
a result, more and more female athletes are finding 
themselves on winning teams.  If the trend continues, as it 
should, don’t be surprised to see the creation of women’s 
professional teams in other sports as well.318 
Male athletes and the selection of sports: Male athletes 
continue to be foreclosed from Title IX relief when seeking to 
maintain their varsity teams, overwhelmingly for meeting the first 
prong of the “effective accommodation” test.  Despite the passage 
of thirty years, no court has ever pronounced an acceptable 
percentage differential to meet the first prong, which requires 
substantial proportionality between the percentage of students and 
the percentage of student-athletes of that same sex.  Despite the 
lack of success in the judicial arena, men may have achieved an 
end-run by commencing a 2002 class action lawsuit, which 
purportedly led to the formation of the Department of Education’s 
Title IX Commission, which may be the catalyst to destroy the 
underpinnings of the statutory gender equity. 
Provision of benefits: The emerging inquiry will be how 
strictly the courts will enforce the equal opportunity requirements 
for the component benefits and treatments afforded athletic 
programs that have separate teams for males and females.  Despite 
the passage of thirty years, it is only recently that this matter is 
being judicially reviewed.  As was previously highlighted, one 
district court perceptively noted, “[u]nfortunately, the Board’s plan 
leaves much to be desired; it creates the impression that the Board 
 
318 Editorial, Thank Title IX, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 24, 1999, at A18. 
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is not as sensitive as it should be regarding the necessity of 
compliance with Title IX.”319 
Athletic scholarships: Moreover, no court has ever 
pronounced an acceptable percentage differential to satisfy the 
allocation of athletic scholarships when separate programs are 
provided for male and female student-athletes.  However, the OCR 
indicated that it would accept a one percent differential (or one 
scholarship) between the percentage of athletes of one sex and the 
percentage of athletic scholarships for the student-athletes. 
Funding of athletic departments: The funding loophole 
continues to allow inequitable funding, as the regulations only 
require “necessary funding.” 
Athletic department employees: The initiation of Title IX 
lawsuits by educational employees, including female athletic 
employees or coaches of women’s teams, has increased 
dramatically.  The issue of whether a litigant may raise a Title IX 
cause of action for sex discrimination, aside from asserting Title 
IX-based retaliation, remains unresolved.  Recent developments—
including settlements in the Lowrey v. Texas A&M University 
System lawsuit (after the issuance of the Fifth Circuit decision 
rejecting Title IX as a basis to assert sex discrimination as opposed 
to retaliation) and the Perdue v. City University of New York case, 
as well as decisions not to appeal after the long-awaited decision 
by the Ninth Circuit in Stanley v. University of Southern California 
and the Sixth Circuit decision in Weaver v. Ohio State 
University—do not help to resolve the issue.  Ultimately, it will 
probably require a Supreme Court resolution unless Congress 
chooses to act.  The dramatic lack of females coaching males 
continues to be ignored, and is ripe for a major lawsuit.  This 
coincides with the low numbers of women employed as head 
athletic administrators, or sports information directors nationally. 
The “glass sneaker” continues to exist for females in athletics 
and its continued vulnerability has become glaringly evident since 
entering the new millennium.  Aside from the failure to ensure 
gender equity in athletics thirty years later, there is another 
 
319 Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, Fla., 995 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (M.D. Fla. 
1997). 
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potentially devastating issue percolating on the horizon as to 
whether the Eleventh Amendment will eviscerate Title IX’s 
application to state educational institutions.  Moreover, the case 
commenced by the National Wrestling Coaches Association must 
be watched as it attempts to eviscerate the Title IX regulations and 
Policy Interpretation.  Additionally, the Secretary of Education’s 
action, in response to the issuance of the February 2003 report by 
the Department of Education’s Title IX commission, should be 
monitored to determine any restrictions in the statute’s application 
to extracurricular athletics.  The Title IX history has not been a 
smooth one.  The good news is that the spirit of Title IX continues 
to persevere  despite significant obstacles. 
The twenty-first century provides an uncharted landscape to 
truly implement the law and spirit of Title IX eliminating 
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and 
activities by providing not some opportunity for females, but equal 
opportunity for all. 
 
